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INTRODUCTION 
The boundaries of the Second Amendment do not coincide 
with the boundaries of gun control. The Amendment does not 
reach, let alone prohibit,1 all direct burdens imposed by gun con-
trol.2 Conversely, it might apply to—and could invalidate—some 
incidental burdens imposed by civil suits or other gun-neutral 
laws of general applicability.3 
District of Columbia v Heller4 makes the first of these prop-
ositions clear, holding that certain “longstanding prohibitions” 
like bans on possession by felons and the mentally ill fall outside 
the scope of the Second Amendment.5 In the wake of Heller, 
lower courts have adopted and extended the Court’s analysis to 
other well-established types of regulation. With regard to these 
categories of regulation, scrutiny is not an issue; the Second 
Amendment “just does not show up.”6 
The second proposition—that the Second Amendment might 
cover gun-neutral laws of general applicability—is not (yet) a 
matter of blackletter law but is easy enough to illustrate. Heller 
 
 1 The distinction between reaching and prohibiting echoes the distinction between 
coverage and protection. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amend-
ment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1769 
(2004) (explaining the distinction between coverage and protection in the First Amend-
ment context). 
 2 See Part II.A. 
 3 See Part II.B. 
 4 554 US 570 (2008). 
 5 Id at 626. 
 6 Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1769 (cited in note 1) (discussing the First Amendment). 
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struck down a safe-storage rule that, with some exceptions, pe-
nalized gun owners who failed to keep their guns locked or dis-
assembled when not in use.7 That law directly burdened gun 
possession and thus constituted “gun control” in the traditional 
sense. But what if the DC courts had held that ordinary negli-
gence law created a duty of care identical to that imposed by the 
safe-storage regulation and thus that gun owners were civilly li-
able for injuries caused by failures to keep their guns locked or 
disassembled?8 Or what if the prosecutor’s office brought crimi-
nal negligence charges against a gun owner on the same basis?9 
The Second Amendment’s relevance to these indirect bur-
dens on guns remains unclear as a matter of doctrine and theo-
ry.10 Whether gun-neutral regulations implicate the Second 
Amendment raises at least three fundamental inquiries: What 
kinds of behavioral constraints are constitutionally significant?11 
How does answering—or even entertaining—that question help 
define the boundaries of constitutional rights? And is it possible 
to answer any constitutional question of this type without an a 
priori theory of the constitutional right at issue? 
In addressing these questions, this Article contributes to 
scholarship on the Second Amendment, and on constitutional law 
more generally, in three ways. First, it demonstrates that “gun 
control”—conventionally understood as direct legislative regula-
tion of the use, possession, sale, and manufacture of firearms—is 
just one part of a larger regulatory environment. Second, it offers 
 
 7 Heller, 554 US at 575 (discussing the DC Code’s exceptions to the safe-storage re-
quirement, including exceptions for places of business and for lawful recreational purposes). 
 8 See, for example, Estate of Strever v Cline, 924 P2d 666, 669 (Mont 1996) (“We 
conclude that Susanj did owe a duty to not only Robert but also to the public in general 
to store his firearm and ammunition in a safe and prudent manner.”). 
 9 See, for example, People v Heber, 745 NYS2d 835, 842–43 (NY Sup 2002) (deny-
ing a motion to dismiss on charges of negligent homicide and reckless endangerment af-
ter a child accidently shot and killed himself because he found a loaded gun that the 
owner had not stored properly). See also Nicholas J. Johnson, et al, Firearms Law and 
the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy 19 (Wolters Kluwer 2012) (“As 
with any potentially lethal instrument, the general rules of criminal and civil negligence 
apply to your use and storage of a firearm.”). 
 Although criminal and civil liability have some important differences—obvious state 
action, constitutionally guaranteed procedure, and the like—for our purposes they are 
relevantly similar when they do not target guns as such and therefore do not constitute 
traditional gun control. 
 10 See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L Rev 1443, 1456–
61 (2009).  
 11 We focus here on the threshold question of coverage and not on the level of pro-
tection—that is, we are interested in whether the Second Amendment applies at all. 
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a framework with which to evaluate the constitutional salience 
of incidental burdens. Finally, it highlights the need for a more 
comprehensive and integrated theory of the Second Amendment 
and outlines three such theories. 
Part I identifies how the law regulates firearms in ways 
that are not conventionally thought of as gun control. Black-
letter tort law, criminal law, and property law define individual 
freedoms to legally keep, carry, and use firearms. Whether the 
issue is liability for threatening displays of guns,12 negligence for 
the alleged misuse of weapons,13 or the exclusion of guns from 
private property,14 these legal rules can have a significant im-
pact on the possession and use of guns. The legal burdens they 
impose can be thought of as incidental because they do not ex-
plicitly regulate guns as such.15 
As a general matter, such incidental burdens on constitu-
tional rights are a widespread phenomenon. With varying levels 
of success, judges and scholars have examined incidental bur-
dens on speech,16 religious practice,17 property,18 and other con-
stitutionally protected activities.19 By contrast, few courts and 
 
 12 See Part I.A.2. 
 13 See Part I.B. 
 14 See Part I.C. 
 15 We do not suppose that the line between direct and incidental burdens in this 
context will always be clear, any more than the line between such burdens is clear when 
it comes to speech. But drawing the line between laws that explicitly regulate guns and 
those that do not seems to be a reasonable first pass at the problem. For a related dis-
cussion in the First Amendment context, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the 
Constitution, 75 Iowa L Rev 111, 112 (1989):  
A law is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” if it (a) does not explic-
itly restrict speech, and (b) is not justified by reference to interests that are di-
rectly related to the restriction of speech, and (c) does not restrict expressive con-
duct because of the reactions of others to the content of the message conveyed. 
 16 See, for example, Cohen v Cowles Media Co, 501 US 663, 665 (1991) (holding that 
the First Amendment does not exempt journalists from generally applicable rules re-
garding promissory estoppel); Clark v Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 US 288, 
289 (1984) (holding that the First Amendment does not exempt political protests from 
generally applicable National Park Service rules regarding camping). 
 17 See, for example, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v Smith, 494 US 872, 878–82 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability 
are not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause). 
 18 The regulatory takings inquiry has similar features, inasmuch as it seeks to 
identify laws that do not directly “take” property but should nonetheless be treated as 
having done so. See Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 123–
24 (1978) (describing a three-factor test). 
 19 For simplicity’s sake, at this initial stage we use “constitutionally protected ac-
tivity” as something of a shorthand, recognizing that constitutional rights prevent cer-
tain kinds of rules rather than prevent protected activities per se. See generally Matthew 
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commentators have yet paid sustained attention to the regula-
tion of guns by anything other than conventional gun control.20 
This omission is in need of a remedy, and soon. The super-
heated politics of guns mean that nearly any regulatory measure 
can spark a conflagration over “gun control” without any agree-
ment on what that term actually means.21 Further, incidental 
burdens on gun-related activities are likely to become more visi-
ble and contested, especially in places where traditional gun 
control is rolled back by legislative or judicial actions or where 
states impose strict scrutiny standards of review through state 
constitutional amendments.22 Moreover, the kinds of neutral 
laws that impose these incidental burdens also establish base-
lines against which Second Amendment concepts like “law-
abiding citizens” and “lawful purposes”23 are defined. Recent 
statutory changes24 shift these baselines, generating unforeseen 
constitutional consequences.25 Any complete discussion of the 
 
D. Adler, Rights against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 
Mich L Rev 1 (1998). 
 20 This omission is by no means universal, however. See generally, for example, 
Don B. Kates, The Limited Importance of Gun Control from a Criminological Perspective, 
in Timothy D. Lytton, ed, Suing the Gun Industry: A Battle at the Crossroads of Gun 
Control and Mass Torts 62 (Michigan 2006); Tom Diaz, The American Gun Industry: De-
signing & Marketing Increasingly Lethal Weapons, in Lytton, ed, Suing the Gun Industry 
84 (cited in note 20). See also Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense 
in Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second 
Amendment Musings, 60 Hastings L J 1205, 1231–43 (2009); Andrew Jay McClurg, The 
Second Amendment Right to Be Negligent, 68 U Fla L Rev *15–35 (forthcoming 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/A7K7-36DE. 
 21 See, for example, Amanda Crawford, Arizona Cities May Sell Guns under Anti-
destruction Bill (Bloomberg, Feb 20, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5M96-BM7U 
(quoting Charles Heller of the Arizona Citizens Defense League as saying that 
“[a]nything that diminishes the use and the utility of firearms—anything—is gun con-
trol”); Michael S. Rosenwald, Store Backs Away from Smart Guns Following Outcry from 
2nd Amendment Activists (Wash Post, Mar 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EUP4 
-7NDC (discussing opposition to the marketing of a gun with smart technology). 
 22 See, for example, La Const Art I, § 11; Mo Const Art I, § 23. 
 23 Heller, 554 US at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”). See also id at 644 (Stevens 
dissenting) (“[W]hen it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second 
Amendment, the Court limits the protected class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”). 
 24 See, for example, Niraj Chokshi, What Georgia’s Expansive New Pro-Gun Law Does 
(Wash Post, Apr 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/L96H-MSV5. See also Jeffrey A. 
Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 Fordham L Rev 1689, 1716–23 (2014) (explor-
ing the related question of how courts should address common-law questions in the 
“gaps” between related statutes).  
 25 See, for example, Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 63 Wash U L Rev 
*1 (forthcoming 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/74KM-EPNA (arguing that “enhanced 
Second Amendment rights trigger Fourth Amendment protections that could radically 
transform American policing”). By focusing on these contemporary developments, we do 
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regulatory landscape, whether laudatory or critical, must ac-
count for these types of incidental burdens. 
Identifying these burdens is only part of the task; whether 
and when incidental burdens raise constitutional concerns is an 
exceedingly vexing question whose answer is often assumed ra-
ther than articulated.26 It is difficult to discern a transsubstan-
tive rule or set of principles from the Supreme Court’s occasional 
forays into the field. In some cases, the Court unhesitatingly 
subjects standard tort and contract claims to constitutional scru-
tiny.27 In others, the Court insulates laws of general applicability 
from constitutional review.28 In either set of cases, the threshold 
question is whether the Constitution applies at all, and that 
question rarely has an obvious answer. For example, it is tempt-
ing to dismiss tort claims as private ordering between individu-
als that are not subject to the Constitution. But as free speech 
doctrine demonstrates, the constitutional issue cannot be avoid-
ed so easily.29 
Part II of this Article suggests a framework with which to 
approach these questions, using incidental burdens to illuminate 
the boundary conditions of the Second Amendment. While some 
direct burdens on the right to keep and bear arms implicate the 
Constitution, others, for reasons of history or longevity, do not.30 
Equally, there may be some indirect burdens that do not directly 
regulate guns but that implicate the Constitution because of their 
history, significance to the individual, structural consequences, or 
 
not mean to slight the importance of other tectonic shifts in the law, such as the rise of 
strict liability in products-liability cases over the past few decades.  
 26 See Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 1) (“[T]he question whether 
the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too often 
simply assumed.”). 
 27 See, for example, New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 268 (1964) (sub-
jecting libel law to scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Shelley v 
Kraemer, 334 US 1, 18–23 (1948) (subjecting property and contract law to scrutiny under 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 431–32 (1984) (subjecting 
family law to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 28 See, for example, Smith, 494 US at 878–79. 
 29 See Part II.B.3. 
 30 See Heller, 554 US at 626–27:  
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws for-
bidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and gov-
ernment buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.  
See also Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment 
Can Teach Us about the Second, 122 Yale L J 852, 867 (2013).  
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purpose. We suggest that these four factors—discussed in detail 
below31—represent modalities that judges can employ to determine 
whether an incidental burden raises a constitutional question.32 
Judicial use of these modalities will define the contours of 
the Second Amendment, separating constitutional space from 
nonconstitutional space. And the jurisprudential significance of 
that separation will increase if the Supreme Court continues to 
edge away from the tiers of scrutiny and toward a more rule-
based approach.33 In a regime that puts a premium on clearly de-
fined boundaries and bright lines, the question of constitutional 
coverage is critical—if not dispositive—and so it is essential to 
identify the tools with which courts may draw those lines. 
But as Part III shows, these modalities for evaluating inci-
dental burdens—their history, individual significance, structural 
relevance, and purpose—also demand a more comprehensive ac-
count of the Second Amendment. As a doctrinal matter, Heller 
may have resolved the decades-long fight over whether the 
Amendment is limited to militia service or extends to individual 
uses such as self-defense. But defining the Second Amendment 
as protecting an individual right does not end the debate about 
the right’s purpose any more than the individual nature of free 
speech resolves the question whether that freedom primarily 
protects autonomy,34 promotes democracy,35 or facilitates a mar-
ketplace of ideas.36 
There are at least three plausible ways to understand the 
individual self-defense right announced in Heller.37 The first 
 
 31 See Part II.B. 
 32 In this respect, we both differ from and acknowledge our debt to Professor Philip 
Bobbitt’s six modalities of constitutional argument. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional 
Fate: Theory of the Constitution 7–8, 93–94 (Oxford 1982). 
 33 The Second Amendment provides a particularly useful object of study in this re-
gard because the individual right it protects was only recently recognized by the Su-
preme Court. See Heller, 554 US at 592. The nascent doctrine is thus largely unbur-
dened by precedent, and it is more directly reflective of current trends that seem to favor 
rules over standards. See Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness of Rules-
Based Jurisprudence, 46 Tulsa L Rev 431, 432–33 (2011) (describing Chief Justice John 
Roberts’s preference for rules over standards).  
 34 See, for example, C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S Cal L 
Rev 979, 981 (1997). 
 35 See, for example, Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government 94 (Harper & Brothers 1948). 
 36 See, for example, Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes 
dissenting). 
 37 These three theories strike us as covering the most plausible self-defense theo-
ries of the Second Amendment, but there are certainly other possibilities. See generally 
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approach is that the Second Amendment right protects individual 
gun owners’ autonomy, irrespective of its impact on public or per-
sonal safety or the ability to resist the government. A second ap-
proach posits that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to 
self-defense against the government. A third approach is that, 
just as truth is most likely to emerge from an open marketplace of 
ideas, optimal security is likely to occur when people can freely 
keep and bear arms as a deterrent to antagonists—a marketplace 
of violence, so to speak.38 On this view, just as “the counter to 
negative or damaging speech is to allow more speech,”39 the “only 
thing that stops a bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a gun.”40 
These three theories lead to different conclusions regarding 
which burdens on guns should be recognized as constitutionally 
salient. All three have descriptive and normative merits and 
demerits. Our goal here is to describe these theories and their 
importance rather than to choose one over the others. We sus-
pect that the Second Amendment, like the First Amendment, 
will be shaped largely in a common-law fashion by the competi-
tion between these approaches or others like them and that no 
single approach will fully displace the others. 
Looking beyond the doctrine and theory for a moment, our 
(perhaps immodest) hope is to help reframe the gun debate. 
People sometimes treat that debate as one between gun control 
on the one hand and the Second Amendment on the other,41 and 
the parties often fight about “gun control” without any agree-
ment as to what that term really means. This confusion obscures 
the degree to which gun regulation operates within a complex 
legal and social ecology. Cutting back on gun control will in-
crease the relevance of incidental burdens on guns; repealing 
 
Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second 
Amendment, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 131 (2008).  
 38 See Part III.C. 
 39 Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and Popu-
lar Democracy, 79 Denver U L Rev 65, 87 (2001), citing New York Times, 376 US at 304. 
See also Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis concurring) (“If there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the pro-
cesses of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
 40 Peter Overby, NRA: ‘Only Thing That Stops a Bad Guy with a Gun Is a Good 
Guy with a Gun’ (NPR, Dec 21, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/QU56-TPE6 (quoting 
National Rifle Association (NRA) Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre). 
 41 See, for example, Tim Devaney, GOP Gains Slam Door on Gun Control Push (The 
Hill, Nov 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZN8D-L94J (quoting NRA spokeswoman 
Jennifer Baker as saying that “[w]e now have a Senate leader [Mitch McConnell] who is 
pro-Second Amendment, so it will be more difficult for them to pass gun control 
measures”). See also generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 BU L Rev 813 (2014). 
 2016] What Is Gun Control? 303 
 
statutes will lead to more private ordering through law; the so-
cial acceptance or rejection of practices like open carry will de-
termine whether those practices are tortious. The gun debate, 
like the Second Amendment itself, is about more than just gun 
control. 
I.  INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON GUNS 
Falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater and causing a 
panic is the prototypical example of constitutionally unprotected 
speech.42 In the wake of the mass murder in Aurora, Colorado,43 
and other movie theater shootings,44 falsely shouting “Gun!” and 
causing a panic seems likely to be unprotected as well. What 
happens, then, if a person actually brings a gun to a movie thea-
ter and causes a panic? Does the Second Amendment insulate 
him from tort or criminal liability? Recently, opponents of gun 
regulation have openly carried AR-15s outside meetings of gun 
control groups45 (including those at which victims of gun violence 
were speaking46), at rallies opposing President Barack Obama47 
(including those at which the president was present48), and in 
stores and restaurants.49 In response, some private businesses—
 
 42 Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of 
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic.”). See also Harry Kalven Jr, A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 
133 (Harper & Row 1988) (“Schenck—and perhaps even Holmes himself—are best re-
membered for the example of the man ‘falsely shouting fire’ in a crowded theater.”). 
 43 Michael Pearson, Gunman Turns ‘Batman’ Screening into Real-Life ‘Horror Film’ 
(CNN, July 20, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/WBX5-JDT5 (describing the mass 
murder of individuals at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, during a showing of The 
Dark Knight Rises). 
 44 See, for example, Doug Stanglin, No Bail for Suspect in Texting Shooting at Mov-
ie Theater (USA Today, Jan 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y2VW-5TYT (describ-
ing a movie theater shooting in Florida after a dispute over texting). 
 45 See Cathaleen Qiao Chen, A Right-to-Bear-Arms Twist: Rallying with a Gun in 
Hand (NY Times, Apr 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P9SD-WW5K; Liz Klimas, 
Open Carry Advocates Stand outside Moms against Gun Violence Meeting: Tell Us If You 
Think They Went Too Far (The Blaze, Nov 11, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U7Y7 
-NZKY.  
 46 See Jessica Chasmar, 1 Arrested after Gun Rights, Gun Control Activists Clash 
at N.H. Rally Hosted by Bloomberg Group (Wash Times, June 19, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/255K-MYRJ. 
 47 Carol Cratty, Man Carries Assault Rifle to Obama Protest—and It’s Legal (CNN, 
Aug 18, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/9KJD-9BQN. 
 48 Declan McCullagh, Gun-Toting Man Draws Scrutiny outside Obama Town Hall 
(CBS News, Aug 11, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/EV9E-R3GX. 
 49 See Carol Kuruvilla, Armed Gun Activists Gather at Newtown Starbucks, Sparking 
Outrage in the Grieving Community (NY Daily News, Aug 10, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/HQL7-TT7E (describing a clash between gun-rights and gun control activists 
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Target and Starbucks among them—have begun posting “no guns” 
signs.50 If a gun owner disregards such a sign and is charged with 
trespass, can he raise a Second Amendment defense?51 
These scenarios raise questions about the regulation of guns 
but not about gun control as such. Some involve private rights 
and others derive from public regulations, but they all involve 
generally applicable rules—tort law, property law, and the 
like—that occasionally apply to gun-related activities. The bur-
dens that these regulations impose on the possession and use of 
guns are therefore incidental to the regulatory text and overall 
design. These burdens often are ignored in popular and scholar-
ly debates about gun control and the Second Amendment, but 
they raise extraordinarily important and complex questions. The 
goal of the following discussion is to illustrate the scope of those 
questions and the potential applicability of these neutral rules 
to gun-related activities. Part II presents a framework with 
which to identify whether these rules, as applied to gun-related 
activity, raise Second Amendment questions. 
A. Intentional Torts and Criminal Law 
Perhaps the most obvious legal rules that implicate gun 
ownership and use are intentional torts, such as assault and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and the analo-
gous criminal prohibitions that forbid activities like “menacing.” 
Gun possession is not a necessary element of these legal rules—
they apply whether a person wields a gun, a hammer, or no 
weapon at all.52 And because these rules do not focus on guns as 
such, the burdens that they impose on the freedom to keep and 
bear arms are incidental. 
 
at a Starbucks roughly two miles from the scene of the Newtown elementary school 
shooting where gun activists had gathered to support Starbucks for allowing its custom-
ers to carry firearms in its stores).  
 50 Ben Brody, Target to Customers: No Guns Please (CNN, July 2, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/WN92-CPG4 (noting that some businesses, including Target, Chili’s, 
and Sonic, have requested that customers enter unarmed).  
 51 See Ellen Jean Hirst and Bob McCoppin, Concealed Carry: Illinois Businesses Face a 
Loaded Issue over Concealed Carry Law (Chi Trib, July 29, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/32ZX-6MG6 (analyzing the heated debate over whether business owners can 
or should prohibit concealed-carry-permit holders from carrying guns on their property).  
 52 There are, of course, many gun-specific crimes and sentencing enhancements. 
See, for example, 28 USC § 924(c) (setting mandatory minimum sentences for persons 
who use or carry firearms in furtherance of certain crimes). We hold these aside because 
they are more likely to impose direct burdens on the keeping and bearing of arms.  
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1. Assault and related crimes. 
A person commits an assault when he acts either intending 
to cause harmful or offensive contact with another person or in-
tending to put another person in imminent apprehension of such 
contact, and the other person is thereby put in such imminent 
apprehension.53 Unsurprisingly, the use of a gun can contribute 
to civil liability in assault cases. A person who points a gun at 
another person and thereby creates a reasonable fear of immi-
nent harm has committed an assault.54 The mere mention of a 
gun is probably not enough to satisfy this standard,55 but a gun-
wielding person can be held liable for assault even if the gun is 
not loaded,56 if it is not pointed at anyone,57 or if no one sees it.58 
The same basic rules apply to criminal assault59 and related 
crimes. Actions that give rise to tort liability for assault may al-
so give rise to criminal liability on a variety of other grounds. It 
is generally illegal, for example, to “menace” a person,60 and the 
use of a gun can be a factor in determining liability.61 This is not 
 
 53 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965). See also Kline v Kline, 64 NE 9, 9 
(Ind 1902). 
 54 See, for example, Jordan v Wilson, 5 S3d 442, 449 (Miss App 2008) (“In her com-
plaint, Jordan alleged that Wilson pointed a firearm at her and that she feared for her 
life. This was sufficient to state a claim for the intentional tort of assault.”); Lowry v 
Standard Oil Co of California, 146 P2d 57, 60 (Cal App 1944) (“The pointing of a gun at 
another in a threatening manner is sufficient to cause fear of personal injury unless it is 
known by the person at whom the weapon is pointed that the gun is in fact unloaded.”); 
Chapman v State, 78 Ala 463, 464 (1884) (holding that brandishing an unloaded gun will 
not support a conviction for criminal assault but may sustain a civil tort suit).  
 55 See Durivage v Tufts, 51 A2d 847, 849 (NH 1947) (holding that the plaintiff could 
not maintain a tort action for assault based solely on the defendant’s verbal threat that 
he would shoot the plaintiff if he had a gun). 
 56 See Beach v Hancock, 27 NH 223, 229 (1853) (“So if a person present a pistol, 
purporting to be a loaded pistol, at another, and so near as to have been dangerous to life 
if the pistol had gone off; semble that this is an assault, even though the pistol were, in 
fact, not loaded.”). 
 57 See Castiglione v Galpin, 325 S2d 725, 726 (La App 1976) (“[W]e are convinced 
from the circumstances surrounding the incident that defendant’s action (whether the 
gun remained on defendant’s lap or was pointed at plaintiffs) resulted in plaintiffs being 
placed in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery and was sufficient to constitute 
an assault.”). 
 58 See State v Misner, 763 P2d 23, 25 (Mont 1988) (“We conclude that it was not 
necessary that Mr. Taber personally observe the gun being waved at him in order to ex-
perience reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury.”). 
 59 See State v Hagberg, 920 P2d 86, 90 (Mont 1996) (upholding a conviction for fel-
ony assault when the victim believed, but did not see, that the defendant was holding a 
gun out of his sight). 
 60 William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 94 (Cavendish 
2001) (Wayne Morrison, ed) (originally published 1768).  
 61 See State v Wardlow, 1999 WL 595357, *2 (Ohio App):  
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to say that the simple act of carrying a gun is criminal menacing 
(at least not in states where open carry is legal62), only that it can 
be in certain circumstances—if the gun is pointed at someone else, 
for example63 (though this does not seem to be strictly required64). 
Some jurisdictions treat these incidents separately as “unlawful 
display[s] of a firearm,”65 but we hold such laws aside because the 
burdens they impose are direct rather than incidental.66 
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
disturbing the peace. 
A person commits the tort of IIED when he intentionally 
causes “severe emotional harm” to another person by engaging 
 
The jury was presented with two divergent stories, i.e., that while ordering the 
men off her property she either pointed the gun at the men, or that she simply 
held the gun at her side. If the jury believed the former, she was guilty of at 
least Menacing; if it believed the latter, she was not guilty of anything.  
See also People v Silva, 680 NYS2d 43, 44 (NY Crim 1998) (“[D]efendant[’s] state[ment] 
that he was going to ‘smoke’ the undercover police officer . . . conjoined with defendant’s 
simultaneous action of reaching into his waistband, an area traditionally associated with 
a secreted handgun . . . makes out the crime of second-degree Menacing.”); City of Akron 
v Boyd, 1983 WL 3904, *1 (Ohio App) (affirming the conviction of a defendant convicted 
of menacing when he placed a holstered gun on his lap pointing toward another person). 
 62 See, for example, Ex parte Pate, 145 S3d 733, 738 (Ala 2013) (“[W]e conclude that 
Pate’s getting the gun, without more, was not sufficient to establish the physical-action 
element of menacing.”); Graham v Commonwealth, 667 SW2d 697, 699 (Ky App 1983) 
(holding that a gun “being waved at someone rather than just being brandished in the 
air” constituted menacing). 
 63 Wood v State, 2003 WL 22863086, *2 (Del) (holding that pointing a gun at some-
one is menacing). 
 64 See People v Hines, 780 P2d 556, 559 (Colo 1989) (“We also conclude that an of-
fender may commit felony menacing by the ‘use’ of a firearm without actually pointing 
the firearm at another person.”). 
 65 State v Baggett, 13 P3d 659, 662 (Wash App 2000) (upholding a conviction for the 
unlawful display of a firearm). See also People v Hall, 100 Cal Rptr 2d 279, 285 (Cal App 
2000) (discussing the crime of “draw[ing] or exhibit[ing] any firearm, whether loaded or 
unloaded,” and concluding that “[w]hen the evidence shows the weapon was exhibited in 
a rude, angry or threatening manner, the offense is complete”). 
 66 For similar reasons, we do not discuss the important and interesting distinction 
between “brandishing” and simple open carrying. See, for example, Morris v Common-
wealth, 607 SE2d 110, 114 (Va 2005) (defining “to brandish” as “to exhibit or expose in 
an ostentatious, shameless, or aggressive manner”); People v Sanders, 905 P2d 420, 457 
(Cal 1996) (“The crime of brandishing consists of drawing or exhibiting, in the presence 
of another person, any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, in a rude, angry or threat-
ening manner. The weapon need not have been pointed directly at a victim.”) (citation 
omitted); State v Overshon, 528 SW2d 142, 143 (Mo App 1975) (“[I]t [is] unlawful for a 
person to exhibit, in the presence of one or more persons, a deadly weapon in a rude, an-
gry or threatening manner.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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in “extreme and outrageous conduct.”67 In some circumstances, 
the use of a gun may be the basis for an IIED claim68—for exam-
ple, if the presence of a gun contributes to the emotional distress 
that is inflicted.69 But as the definition suggests, the burden on 
the plaintiff is extremely high: simply being scared by the pres-
ence of a gun70 is generally not enough.71  
The closest criminal analogues to the tort of IIED are rules 
against harassment,72 disorderly conduct,73 and disturbance of the 
peace74 (or its historical antecedent, affray75). For these purposes, 
 
 67 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 (2012). 
 68 See Cullison v Medley, 570 NE2d 27, 31 (Ind 1991) (noting the possibility of IIED 
when the defendants threatened harm while one was armed with a revolver).  
 69 Compare Davis v Copelan, 452 SE2d 194, 203 (Ga App 1994) (finding sufficient 
evidence to support an IIED claim when “there [was] evidence that Pat Cheek conspired 
with Officer Russell to separately and unexpectedly call plaintiffs to her office for the 
intimidating, abusive and well-planned termination interviews,” and further noting that 
“the evidence show[ed] that Pat Cheek allowed an armed law enforcement officer to at-
tend the meetings; that she permitted the officer to dominate the meetings and that she 
acquiesced in the officer’s intimidating, overbearing and abusive conduct”), with Hol-
loway v Wachovia Bank & Trust Co, NA, 452 SE2d 233, 236, 243–44 (NC 1994) (uphold-
ing summary judgment against one plaintiff on an IIED claim despite an allegation that 
the defendant had aimed a gun at the plaintiff, because the plaintiff ’s own testimony in-
dicated that she did not suffer severe and disabling emotional distress, while reversing 
summary judgment for the other plaintiffs). 
 70 See, for example, Sharp v Paul, 2013 WL 1278185, *3 (Cal App) (finding that ev-
idence did not support a restraining order, which is subject to same standard as IIED, 
because the plaintiff admitted both that he did not feel threatened when the defendant 
pointed the gun at him and that the defendant did not intend to threaten him); Montross 
v United Parcel Service of America, Inc, 2002 WL 318336, *1 (ND Tex) (affirming sum-
mary judgment dismissing an IIED claim when the defendant’s employee, “who had a 
camera at the time, suggested that Ritman point the rifle at Montross’s head so she 
could take a picture . . . which caused Montross to fear for his safety”). 
 71 See, for example, Clark v Elam Sand and Gravel, Inc, 777 NYS2d 624, 625 (NY 
Sup 2004) (rejecting an IIED claim when the alleged wrongful conduct consisted of 
“showing [the plaintiff] a gun on various occasions and by innuendo he would use to 
shoot whoever installed the devices, he would become belligerent, slam doors, talk sar-
castically to the Plaintiff and sarcastically asked to use the phones when there was no 
need to do so”) (brackets in original). 
 72 See, for example, MPC § 250.4 (ALI 1962). 
 73 See, for example, MPC § 250.2 (ALI 1962); City of Chicago v Roma, 374 NE2d 
1097, 1098 (Ill App 1978) (reversing a conviction for disorderly conduct when the defend-
ant’s gun was “was wrapped in a plastic bag, [in] an attache case . . . approximately 25 
feet away” from him). 
 74 See, for example, State v Albert, 184 SE2d 605, 607 (SC 1971) (affirming the de-
fendant’s conviction for rioting, defined as a “tumultuous disturbance of the peace,” for 
taking control of the library at Vorhees College while armed). 
 75 See, for example, Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The 
Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L Rev 487, 501 (2004) (discussing 
the use of affray to regulate gun-related activities). 
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we hold aside related prohibitions on brandishing,76 unlawful 
display,77 and riding armed to the terror of the people,78 each of 
which imposes direct burdens on arms-related activities. 
As with assault, the use of a gun is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to create liability under these rules, but it can still be 
an important contributing factor.79 The manner in which a per-
son carries or displays a gun,80 the reasonableness of the plain-
tiff ’s response,81 and an assessment of the overall context will all 
factor into whether liability attaches. 
Consider the practice of openly carrying guns to gun control 
rallies,82 including those at which victims of gun violence are 
speaking.83 It is plausible to think that this inflicts emotional 
distress on the speakers and that doing so is the intent of some 
(although of course not all) of the carriers.84 It might even be con-
sidered “extreme and outrageous”85 to, for example, bring AR-15s 
 
 76 See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 417 (criminalizing brandishing a weapon). 
 77 See, for example, State v Byrd, 868 P2d 158, 162 (Wash App 1994) (“The grava-
men of the offense of unlawful display of a weapon is displaying and handling of the 
weapon in a manner ‘that either manifests an intent to intimidate another or that war-
rants alarm for the safety of other persons.’”). 
 78 See, for example, ALI, Model Penal Code: Council Draft No 29 47 (Feb 23, 1961) 
(citing individual state codes listing an aggravating factor to misdemeanor riot as “carry-
ing a dangerous weapon”); Portland City Code § 14A.06.010(A) (“It is unlawful for any 
person to knowingly possess or carry a firearm, in or upon a public place . . . having 
failed to remove all the ammunition.”); Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw 3, ch 3 (1328) 
(“[N]o Man great nor small . . . [shall] ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets 
. . . nor in no part elsewhere.”).  
 79 See, for example, Cortez v State, 256 SW2d 855, 855 (Tex Crim App 1953) (“There 
is no offense known as ‘rudely displaying a pistol,’ but such may constitute a violation of 
the disturbing-the-peace statute, when done in a manner calculated to disturb the 
peace.”) (citation omitted). 
 80 See, for example, State v Turley, 521 P2d 690, 691 (Mont 1974) (upholding a con-
viction for disturbance of the peace when “[t]he State’s evidence show[ed] that appellant 
was slapping his pistol against his leg in an agitated manner; he unholstered the weapon 
and pointed it at Fairhurst; he threatened to shoot him; and he spat at Fairhurst’s de-
parting automobile”). 
 81 See Byrd, 868 P2d at 162 (finding that, for the crime of unlawful display, there 
“is no necessary nexus between reasonable apprehension and the defendant’s actual in-
tent” but that “[u]nder some circumstances, apprehension could be reasonable at the 
mere sight of a firearm, while the defendant’s intent could be completely innocent”). 
 82 See, for example, Diana Reese, Moms Demonstrate for Gun Control, Armed Men 
Stage Counter-Protest in Indiana (Wash Post, Mar 29, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3RZ3-36V5. 
 83 See note 46.  
 84 See Mark Follman, Spitting, Stalking, Rape Threats: How Gun Extremists Target 
Women (Mother Jones, May 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NW5D-U8AP.  
 85 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 (2012). 
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to an event dedicated to the victims of a mass shooting perpe-
trated with an AR-15.86 
Gun carriers might respond that this is all backward, that 
simply showing a gun to a person who dislikes them is not tor-
tious,87 and that in fact the gun carriers’ intent is to normalize guns 
rather than to inflict emotional distress.88 Perhaps open carry will 
cause some distress in the short term, but once people see that 
guns contribute to safety instead of threaten it, the basis for legal 
liability will weaken. In this way, shifting private law baselines—
informed by social practice—may be outcome determinative. 
Statutory changes can also nudge the baselines in one direc-
tion or another. In the context of IIED claims for gun carrying, 
for example, one would have to take into account open-carry 
laws, which could be said to represent a public determination 
that guns are not threatening. In this case, liability for IIED 
(and even for assault) should be even harder to prove. For ex-
ample, as of 1967, simply carrying a concealed weapon could 
constitute a breach of the peace in Florida.89 Today, the state has 
a “shall issue” regime for concealed-carry permits.90 That change 
in the background law has major implications for legal liability.91 
 
 86 See note 46. 
 87 Cullison, 570 NE2d at 31 (concluding that the defendant’s knowledge of the 
plaintiff ’s apprehension toward guns was not sufficient on its own to support the conclu-
sion that the defendant intended to inflict emotional injury on the plaintiff when he wore 
a gun in front of the plaintiff). 
 88 See, for example, Klimas, Open Carry Advocates Stand outside Moms against 
Gun Violence Meeting (cited in note 45) (quoting an e-mail from Open Carry Texas that 
stated: “What we are doing is working and society is coming to view the sight of ‘military 
style rifles’ in public as just another normal thing. Isn’t that a good thing?”). 
 89 See Marden v State, 203 S2d 638, 640 (Fla App 1967). 
 90 Fla Stat Ann § 790.06(2). 
 91 With regard to legal liability, it is important to note that these incidental bur-
dens—and others discussed below—might be limited in certain circumstances by the law 
of self-defense, which is the “central component” of the Second Amendment. McDonald v 
City of Chicago, Illinois, 561 US 742, 767 (2010) (“Self-defense is a basic right, recog-
nized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we 
held that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment 
right.”) (citation omitted). How much self-defense law is now constitutional law is an in-
credibly complex inquiry. What is clear is that, at least as currently construed, the Se-
cond Amendment is simultaneously broader and narrower than the common-law rule: 
broader in the sense that it does not require an imminent threat or an objectively justifi-
able apprehension of harm to keep a gun; narrower in the sense that it protects only par-
ticular implements used for self-defense. See MPC § 3.04(1) (ALI 1962) (“[T]he use of 
force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force 
is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlaw-
ful force by such other person on the present occasion.”). 
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B. Negligence 
Blackletter negligence law imposes liability on those who 
cause harm by failing to fulfill a duty of care that is owed to an-
other person.92 Standard negligence doctrine builds in a kind of 
cost-benefit analysis—if the alleged tortfeasor failed to take cost-
justified measures to prevent the harm, then he may be liable.93 
Unsurprisingly, the misuse of guns can give rise to liability for 
civil and criminal negligence, as well as liability under related 
rules regarding civil and criminal recklessness.94 
Perhaps the most heartbreaking cases are those in which a 
child is hurt or killed by an unsecured weapon, a tragedy that 
occurs hundreds of times every year.95 It is also negligent to give, 
sell, or surrender a gun to an adult who is likely to, and does, 
misuse it.96 Such liability is nothing new. Section 308 of the Se-
cond Restatement of Torts explained that 
 
 92 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965). 
 93 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) (“[I]f the 
probability [of an accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate pre-
cautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., 
whether B < PL.”). See also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand For-
mula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand L Rev 813, 
817–18 (2001). 
 94 See, for example, Al-Saud v State, 658 NE2d 907, 910 (Ind 1995) (noting that 
“[t]he brandishing of a firearm in a congested area or during a dispute can create a vari-
ety of risks of bodily injury to others, regardless of whether the weapon is loaded,” and 
that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the defendant “committed a delinquent 
act, i.e., an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute criminal recklessness”); 
Matter of ALJ, 836 P2d 307, 310 (Wyo 1992) (“We interpret § 6–2–504(b) to mean that, 
whenever an actor knowingly points a firearm at another, whether the firearm is loaded 
or not, he is guilty of reckless endangering, provided the firearm was not pointed for de-
fensive purposes.”). 
 In a forthcoming article, Professor Andrew McClurg argues that “through both common 
and statutory law, the United States has enshrined a de facto Second Amendment right to 
be negligent regarding many aspects of making, distributing, and possessing firearms.” 
McClurg, 68 U Fla L Rev at *1 (cited in note 20) (citation omitted). He goes on to criticize 
this result as “ignor[ing] or mischaracteriz[ing the] fundamental scope of liability princi-
ples,” and he says that it “is derived from deference to Second Amendment rights.” Id at *2, 
6. We are in no position to fully evaluate McClurg’s descriptive account of the doctrine. To 
the degree that it is accurate, however, we agree that the Second Amendment cannot 
properly be read to provide blanket immunity for gun-related activities. 
 95 Mark Berman, How Often Do Children in the U.S. Unintentionally Shoot and 
Kill People? We Don’t Know (Wash Post, Sept 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4BHZ 
-SBSY (reporting 591 victims of accidental gun violence in 2011, 102 of which were chil-
dren under the age of 18). See also Michael Luo and Mike McIntire, Children and Guns: 
The Hidden Toll (NY Times, Sept 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4M5K-R7FW. 
 96 See, for example, Angell v F. Avanzini Lumber Co, 363 S2d 571, 572 (Fla App 1978) 
(holding that sellers of a gun who could have inferred from the buyer’s “erratic behavior” 
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[i]t is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to 
engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, 
if the actor knows or should know that such person intends 
or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the ac-
tivity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others.97 
And specifically, the Restatement noted that “it is negligent to 
place loaded firearms . . . within reach of young children or feeble-
minded adults.”98 These rules do not mean that a gun’s owner is 
responsible for all negative consequences of the gun’s misuse99 
but rather that the owner is responsible only for misuse that is 
foreseeable,100 such as when he sells the gun to a person who is 
underage,101 mentally ill,102 or intoxicated.103 
 
that “injury to someone was highly probable” could be held liable for the resulting 
death). 
 97 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 (1965). 
 98 Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 308, comment b (1965). See also, for example, 
Herland v Izatt, 345 P3d 661, 665 (Utah 2015): 
[G]un owners have a duty to exercise reasonable care in supplying their guns 
to others—such as children and incompetent or impaired individuals—whom 
they know, or should know, are likely to use the gun in a manner that creates a 
foreseeable risk of injury to themselves or third parties. 
See also Wroth v McKinney, 373 P2d 216, 219 (Kan 1962) (“It is negligent to place loaded 
firearms or poisons within reach of young children or feeble-minded adults.”); Kuhns v 
Brugger, 135 A2d 395, 402–03 (Pa 1957) (finding that prima facie negligence was estab-
lished by, inter alia, the defendant’s storage of a loaded pistol in an unlocked dresser 
drawer). 
 99 See Rains v Bend of the River, 124 SW3d 580, 595 (Tenn App 2003) (“[T]here is 
no evidence that his conduct or demeanor when he purchased the ammunition should 
have given the clerk at Bend of the River reason to foresee or anticipate that he intended 
to use the ammunition to commit suicide or to misuse it in any other way.”). 
 100 See, for example, Jupin v Kask, 849 NE2d 829, 837 (Mass 2006) (“[T]he risk in 
the instant case—that a mentally unstable and violent person, to whom unfettered and 
unsupervised access to Kask’s home was granted, would take a gun from that home and 
shoot someone—was both foreseeable and foreseen.”).  
 101 See, for example, Lake Washington School District No 414 v Schuck’s Auto Sup-
ply, Inc, 613 P2d 561, 562–63 (Wash App 1980) (explaining that a seller may be held lia-
ble for selling a “dangerous instrumentality” to a child whom the seller knows or ought 
to know is, “by reason of youth and inexperience, unfit to be trusted with it” and who 
then injures himself or a third party). 
 102  See, for example, Rubin v Johnson, 550 NE2d 324, 333 (Ind App 1990) (“[T]he 
recognized unpredictability and dangerous propensities of the mentally ill make the like-
lihood of injury to third persons resulting from the sale of a handgun to an individual of 
unsound mind appear to be logical, and, hence, reasonably [foreseeable].”). 
 103 See, for example, Angell, 363 S2d at 572 (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of 
the plaintiff ’s complaint and finding that a dealer in firearms could have foreseen the 
probability of someone being injured after selling a firearm and ammunition to an “errat-
ic” purchaser). See also Kitchen v K-Mart Corp, 697 S2d 1200, 1208 (Fla 1997) (“We hold 
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In some areas, statutes have codified the common-law duty of 
care. For example, many states have child-access prevention 
(CAP) rules that impose civil or criminal liability on gun owners 
who fail to exercise due care in keeping their guns out of the 
hands of children who may misuse them.104 One perspective is 
that these rules—like the DC safe-storage provision—are direct 
regulations of firearms that implicate the Second Amendment. 
But one might also say that CAP rules simply codify an otherwise-
unremarkable negligence rule, just as some states have codified 
the common-law standards for obscenity or libel to conform to 
Supreme Court rulings.105 
Conversely, some statutes preempt negligence liability for 
gun-related activities. The most prominent example is the Pro-
tection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act106 (PLCAA), which par-
tially shields gun manufacturers from negligence liability for the 
criminal misuse of their products.107 The PLCAA is not a flat bar 
to liability; it specifically permits lawsuits for negligent en-
trustment and negligence per se.108 Nevertheless, such arms-
protecting statutory laws can subtly shift the baseline for what 
counts as gun control subject to the Second Amendment. Prior to 
the PLCAA, many citizens likely understood state tort law con-
cerning firearms as mere background law, no different than laws 
that force a printer to clean up its toxic ink.109 Statutes like the 
 
that an action for negligent entrustment as defined under section 390 of the Restatement 
is consistent with Florida public policy in protecting its citizens from the obvious danger 
of the placement of a firearm in the hands of an intoxicated person.”); Bernethy v Walt 
Failor’s, Inc, 653 P2d 280, 284 (Wash 1982) (reversing summary judgment that was 
granted to a gun shop on a wrongful death action brought after a visibly intoxicated 
man obtained a gun and ammunition from the defendant gun shop and immediately 
shot his wife). 
 104 Regulating Guns in America: An Evaluation and Comparative Analysis of Feder-
al, State and Selected Local Gun Laws *233–34 (Legal Community Against Violence, 
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/F9S8-MTSP. 
 105 Compare NC Gen Stat § 14-190.1(b), and Mich Comp Laws § 600.2911(6), with 
Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973), and New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 
254, 279–80 (1964). 
 106 Pub L No 109-92, 119 Stat 2095 (2005), codified in various sections of Titles 15 
and 18. 
 107 The law provides that “[a] qualified civil liability action may not be brought in 
any Federal or State court.” 15 USC § 7902(a). “Qualified civil liability action” is defined 
as “a civil action . . . brought by any person against a . . . seller of a [firearm] . . . for 
damages . . . resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm] by the person 
or a third party.” 15 USC § 7903(5)(A). 
 108 See, for example, Estate of Kim v Coxe, 295 P3d 380, 386 (Alaska 2013); Gilland 
v Sportsmen’s Outpost, Inc, 2011 WL 2479693, *12 (Conn Super).  
 109 See United States v Fleet Factors Corp, 821 F Supp 707, 712–13 (SD Ga 1993) (find-
ing the defendants, as “owners,” liable for the costs associated with the removal of hazardous 
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PLCAA—accompanied as they are by Second Amendment justi-
fications110—tend to accentuate the public nature of state tort 
law, as opposed to the understanding of tort law as private or-
dering or restorative justice. 
C. Property 
Whether the right to keep and bear arms extends beyond 
one’s own property has been a central Second Amendment ques-
tion in recent years.111 Some gun owners—especially open-carry 
activists—also assert a right to carry guns onto other people’s 
property, and in particular onto the property of private business 
owners. Some business owners have responded by asserting a 
right to exclude guns from their property.112 Whatever other le-
gal issues are involved,113 these scenarios implicate basic princi-
ples of property law. 
1. Trespass. 
As a general matter, private property owners can exclude 
whomever they want for whatever reasons they want.114 This 
right to exclude is frequently called “one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights” known as property.115 Rules 
against trespass are a significant method of protecting this 
right.116 
 
substances from a textile-printing facility); Grillo v Speedrite Products, Inc, 532 SE2d 1, 1–
2 (SC App 2000) (involving a personal injury action against an ink supplier). 
 110 As McClurg notes, the first statement of “[f]indings” in the PLCAA is: “The Se-
cond Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” McClurg, 68 U Fla L Rev at *6 (cited in 
note 20), quoting 15 USC § 7901(a)(1). 
 111 Compare Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir 2014), vacd 
and rehearing en banc granted, 781 F3d 1106 (9th Cir 2015) (holding that California’s 
“may issue” concealed-carry law requiring an applicant to show good cause for carrying 
in public violates the Second Amendment), with Drake v Filko, 724 F3d 426, 440 (3d Cir 
2013) (upholding New Jersey’s concealed-carry law requiring that an applicant present a 
“justifiable need” before issuing a concealed-carry license). 
 112 See note 50 and accompanying text. 
 113 One of us has argued that in some circumstances private property owners have a 
Second Amendment right to exclude guns. See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not 
to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 Stan L Rev 1 (2012). 
 114 See William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England 3 (Cavendish 
2001) (Wayne Morrison, ed) (originally published 1766) (describing the right of property as 
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”).  
 115 Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 164, 176 (1979). 
 116 Trespass can also constitute a criminal offense, for example, when a person re-
fuses to leave after being asked. See MPC § 221.2(2) (ALI 1962). 
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Only an intentional, unprivileged entry onto the land of an-
other constitutes trespass.117 The most straightforward way in 
which an entry can be privileged is through the consent of the 
owner.118 A person who enters private property with the permis-
sion of the owner or possessor has a license to do so and is not a 
trespasser.119 This seems simple enough, and when permissions 
are explicit, it usually is. But the apparent clarity of the consent 
rule quickly gives way to hard questions both as a general mat-
ter and with specific regard to guns. 
Consider the bases for privileged entry into a restaurant. A 
person eating in a restaurant has a license to be there—the res-
taurant owner consents to her entry precisely because she is a cus-
tomer.120 But what if that person is actually a harsh critic who 
gains access by lying about her occupation? In that case, the li-
cense has been obtained through fraud—the restaurant owner 
would not have consented to entry had he known her true identity. 
The law sometimes regards such fraudulently obtained con-
sent as a legitimate defense to a trespass action. Judge Richard 
Posner’s opinion in Desnick v American Broadcasting Compa-
nies, Inc121 is perhaps the leading opinion explaining this sur-
prising result.122 In Desnick, investigative journalists fraudulent-
ly obtained consent to enter ophthalmic clinics by posing as 
patients and promising not to engage in “ambush” journalism.123 
There was no doubt that the consent was obtained under false 
pretenses.124 And yet the court recognized the consent as legiti-
mate, because there was “no invasion . . . of any of the specific 
interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect”—privacy, se-
curity, and the like.125 
 
 117 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, comment c (1965).  
 118 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, comment e (1965). 
 119 Holding aside unusual situations like estoppel, licenses can generally be revoked, 
and a person whose license has been properly revoked must vacate the premises in a 
reasonable time or else she will become a trespasser. Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 171 (1965). 
 120 See Desnick v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, 44 F3d 1345, 1351 (7th 
Cir 1995) (giving the example of a restaurant critic, as well as others). 
 121 44 F3d 1345 (7th Cir 1995).  
 122 See Joseph William Singer, et al, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 3–
4, 9–12 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed 2014) (using Desnick to illustrate trespass and the right 
to exclude). 
 123 Desnick, 44 F3d at 1348. 
 124 Id at 1354–55.  
 125 Id at 1352. 
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Now replace the critic concealing her identity with a patron 
concealing her handgun. Presumably, if the maître d’ knew she 
was carrying a gun, he would have asked her to leave the gun in 
her car or else refused to seat her, which is precisely why she 
concealed it. Has the gun owner committed a trespass? Or is her 
fraudulently obtained consent a defense, as it is for the restau-
rant critic? The basic analysis from cases like Desnick suggests 
that the gun carrier is a trespasser, because—unlike the secret 
critic—her fraud interferes with the interests that the right to 
exclude is meant to protect, especially that of security. 
But, one might object, a concealed carrier cannot be a tres-
passer absent some notice, actual or constructive, that the owner 
prohibits private firearms on the premises. The default rule, in 
other words, should be that business owners presumably con-
sent to have guns on their property. Even if that were the rule, 
the presumption could probably be overcome by a sign forbid-
ding guns on the property. Posting a “no guns allowed” sign126 
would arguably limit the scope of the privilege by conditioning 
the grant of a license on the licensees’ agreement not to carry a 
gun. And though such signs might not automatically transform 
all concealed-gun-carrying shoppers into trespassers,127 it cer-
tainly would strengthen the conclusion that their licenses were 
obtained by fraud. 
As the sign-posting hypothetical suggests, neutral laws of 
general applicability in property law, just like in negligence or 
intentional tort, set baselines that impact the keeping and bear-
ing of arms. For example, requiring gun owners to seek permis-
sion to carry their guns on another person’s land, rather than 
requiring private property owners to identify and exclude guns, 
would set a default rule that might well be outcome determina-
tive. If state law said that guns were forbidden unless a bar or 
restaurant explicitly permitted them,128 then businesses wishing 
to allow guns would have to post a sign saying, “Guns allowed 
 
 126 See note 50 and accompanying text. Even better might be a “no guns allowed (ex-
cept mine)” sign. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the 
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 NYU L Rev 887, 907–08 (2011); Blocher, 
64 Stan L Rev at 26–37 (cited in note 113). 
 127 Desnick itself noted that the court was not resolving the question of “what if any 
difference it would make if the plaintiffs had festooned the premises with signs forbid-
ding the entry of testers or other snoops.” Desnick, 44 F3d at 1353. 
 128 “State law” for these purposes could be the equivalent of a reasonable-access 
statute applicable to public businesses, or it could be simply the courts’ interpretations of 
common-law trespass. 
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here.” An alternative rule saying that guns are permitted unless 
a business explicitly forbids them would lead to some signs say-
ing, “No guns allowed.” Though both of these rules give business 
owners the final say over whether to permit guns, the former re-
gime would almost certainly result in less gun carrying overall 
due to the inevitable stickiness of default rules.129 
Just like open-range and closed-range rules in cattle-
ranching areas,130 opt in and opt out regimes for gun carrying on 
private property represent different ways to allocate the costs of 
preventing certain kinds of harms. In an opt out regime (one in 
which guns are forbidden only if the property owner makes it 
so), business owners would have to make costly enforcement de-
cisions by posting signs, interrogating potential customers, or—
especially in states that permit concealed carry—implementing 
pat downs and metal detectors. In an opt in regime, by contrast, 
gun carriers would face greater costs in that they would need to 
seek out and identify gun-friendly businesses rather than rely-
ing on a default permission. Notably, Georgia’s recent gun law 
incorporates both approaches: bars can opt out, while houses of 
worship and schools can opt in.131 
Some gun-rights advocates go further, saying that neither of 
these default rules is strong enough and that, in fact, the consti-
tutional and statutory regimes require private property owners—
at least those who open their property to the public—to permit 
guns on their land.132 Law does, after all, sometimes abrogate the 
 
 129 See generally Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989). 
 130 Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 Stan L Rev 623, 662–63 (1986). 
 131 Ga Code Ann § 16-11-127(b)(6) (allowing bars to opt out); Ga Code Ann § 16-11-
127(c) (allowing places of worship to opt in); Ga Code Ann § 16-11-127.1(c) (allowing 
schools to opt in).  
 132 See, for example, Jessica Marquez, Employers Fire Back at Law Making It a Fel-
ony to Ban Guns on Company Premises (Workforce, Jan 27, 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KNL3-LWSJ (quoting former NRA President Marion Hammer as saying, 
“We have employers violating the constitutional rights of their employees”); Louise Red 
Corn, NRA to Boycott Companies (Tulsa World, Aug 2, 2005), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6AA4-GQMN (quoting NRA Executive Vice President LaPierre as saying, 
“We’re going to make ConocoPhillips the example of what happens when a corporation 
takes away your Second Amendment rights”); Darrel Rowland, Bill Would Allow Ohio-
ans to Carry Concealed Firearms with No Permit, Training (The Columbus Dispatch, 
Apr 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JL6U-BUJD (describing an Ohio bill that would 
prevent landlords from barring tenants or their guests from having legal firearms).  
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right to exclude—for example, on the basis of race.133 Some 
common-law doctrines, like the “reasonable access” rule, require 
inns and other common carriers to permit access to the public,134 
although these doctrines do not yet require reasonable access to 
an armed public. The issue is whether the baseline—opt in or 
opt out, trespass or reasonable access—should be thought of as a 
constitutional matter, and if it is a constitutional matter, what 
tool of judicial delineation makes it so.135 
2. Nuisance. 
As a conceptual matter, nuisance law is a close cousin of 
trespass.136 Private nuisance is typically defined as a substan-
tial, unreasonable interference with another’s quiet enjoyment 
of his property.137 Public nuisance law covers actions that impose 
costs on a broader community rather than on a specific person.138 
As with trespass, it is easy to imagine how gun ownership 
and use might give rise to nuisance claims. Guns impose exter-
nalities, and controlling externalities is a central function of 
nuisance law.139 A person shooting guns in his backyard, for ex-
ample, might disturb his neighbors with the noise, sight, and 
perceived risk either of the shooting itself or of the possibility 
that lead bullets will contaminate their property or groundwa-
ter.140 In many areas, shooting guns even on one’s own private 
 
 133 See, for example, Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1, 19–21 (1948) (forbidding, on consti-
tutional grounds, the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants); Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 243, codified at 42 USC § 2000a et seq. 
 134 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and 
Private Property, 90 Nw U L Rev 1283, 1305–31 (1996). 
 135 As with self-defense, intentional torts like battery and trespass include excep-
tions for cases of necessity. See Ploof v Putnam, 71 A 188, 189 (Vt 1908) (holding that a 
ship captain could moor his ship on a private dock to escape a damaging storm). If a gun 
carrier were fleeing a true threat or rushing to defend a person who was being assaulted, 
for example, the necessity exception could protect him from civil or criminal trespass lia-
bility. See, for example, United States v Gomez, 92 F3d 770, 778 (9th Cir 1996) (finding 
that the justification defense was available to a felon who was convicted for the posses-
sion of a gun when that felon faced an unlawful and present threat of death).  
 136 Singer, et al, Property Law at 365–66 (cited in note 122). 
 137 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1965). 
 138 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1965).  
 139 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1965).  
 140 Concerned Citizens of Cedar Heights-Woodchuck Hill Road v DeWitt Fish and 
Game Club, Inc, 755 NYS2d 192, 193 (NY App 2003):  
The first cause of action alleges that defendant’s shooting range constitutes a 
private nuisance and the second and third causes of action allege that it consti-
tutes a public nuisance by virtue of the impulse noise associated with the dis-
charge of firearms. The fourth cause of action alleges that defendant’s shooting 
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property will subject the owner to gun-neutral regulations like 
noise-control ordinances. Violation of those laws can support a 
finding of nuisance liability,141 just as compliance with them can 
serve as a strong defense.142 
Nuisance liability is determined through a multifactor test 
that considers, among other things, the severity of the harm, the 
social utility of the activity, whether the plaintiff came to the 
nuisance, and what activities are considered reasonable for the 
particular area at issue.143 Generalizations about such multifac-
tor tests are difficult. One obvious implication, though, is that 
social practices and understandings—in this context, those that 
are shaped by cultural battles over the appropriate use of 
guns—will have a direct impact on the laws that incidentally 
burden guns, for the simple reason that whether an activity is 
reasonable or socially useful depends in part on the baseline 
norms concerning that activity.144 
3. Covenants. 
The law of servitudes can also burden firearm possession 
and use. Real estate covenants are written, legally enforceable 
agreements that require property owners to do or not do certain 
things.145 They are often found in deeds, especially in common-
interest communities like condominiums and housing subdivi-
sions. Scholars have noted the extent to which such communities 
 
range constitutes a public and private nuisance as the result of the discharge of 
lead shot into the air and land. 
 141 See, for example, Kitsap County v Kitsap Rifle and Revolver Club, 337 P3d 328, 
344 (Wash App 2014) (holding that increased noise levels and unsafe conditions at a 
shooting range constituted a public nuisance). 
 142 See, for example, Concerned Citizens of Cedar Heights, 755 NYS2d at 193 (dis-
missing a public nuisance claim in part because the defendant, who operated a shooting 
range, “submitted proof that, at the time of the commencement of the action, it was in 
compliance with the noise control ordinance of the Town of DeWitt”).  
 143 See Singer, et al, Property Law at 346–49 (cited in note 122). 
 144 Consider the fact that in recent years some states have come to treat secondhand 
smoke as a negative externality that might be sufficient to support a nuisance claim. 
See, for example, Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-1101(3). 
 145 Public housing regulations are conceptually similar, but the state actions in 
those scenarios are clear, and so we hold them aside here. See, for example, Doe v Wil-
mington Housing Authority, 880 F Supp 2d 513, 537 (D Del 2012) (finding that lease pro-
visions that prohibited the carrying of firearms in common areas of public housing did 
not violate the residents’ Second Amendment rights); Lincoln Park Housing Commission 
v Andrew, 2004 WL 576260, *1–2 (Mich App) (finding that the Second Amendment was 
unsuccessfully invoked to challenge a lease provision prohibiting the possession of guns 
in government-subsidized housing). 
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have become akin to “private governments,”146 exercising the 
kind of regulatory authority that is typically associated with 
state actors.147 Many of these communities use this authority to 
restrict guns or ban them altogether.148 
In one sense, such covenants are a classic example of private 
ordering. People are free to choose the arrangements that best 
suit them and reject the agreements that do not, just as they 
would with a standard contract. On this reading, there should be 
no problem with covenants restricting or banning guns. People 
who want to live in gun-free neighborhoods can choose to do so, 
just as they can choose to live in communities with uniform set-
backs, a defined color palette, restrictions on aboveground sprin-
klers, or any of the other home-related restrictions that are the 
bread and butter of covenant law. People who wish to have guns 
at home can simply find other places to live. 
The reach of covenant law is broad, but it does have some lim-
its. The law disfavors—and in some cases forbids—covenants that 
violate public policy or that burden certain fundamental rights.149 
The most famous example is Shelley v Kraemer,150 in which the 
Court found that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the judicial 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.151 Even holding aside 
the applicability of the Constitution (an issue addressed in more 
detail below152), one might argue that gun-restrictive covenants 
should be unenforceable on public policy grounds.153 As of 2013, 
 
 146 See generally, for example, Stephen E. Barton and Carol J. Silverman, eds, 
Common Interest Communities: Private Governments and the Public Interest (Institute of 
Governmental Studies 1994). 
 147 See Miller, 86 NYU L Rev at 954 (cited in note 126) (“A home buyer who cove-
nants not to possess firearms is a respectful neighbor; a village of private covenants not 
to possess firearms is a zoning regulation.”). 
 148 See, for example, Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 
U Fla J L & Pub Pol 479, 526 (2009) (noting that most homeowners’ associations (HOAs) 
“reportedly hold restrictions against firearms in homes”). 
 149 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.1 (2000). 
 150 334 US 1 (1948). 
 151 Id at 19–20. See also Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Association v Khan, 46 
A3d 507, 522 (NJ 2012) (finding that an HOA rule banning all signs other than “for sale” 
signs violated the state constitution). 
 152 See Part II. 
 153 Compare Guaranty Realty Co v Recreation Gun Club, 107 P 625, 627–28 (Cal 
App 1910) (involving a failed effort to invoke the right to bear arms against a restrictive 
covenant), with John-Patrick Fritz, Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the 
Door: Questioning the Validity of Restrictive Covenants against the Right to Bear Arms, 
35 Sw U L Rev 551, 576 (2007) (arguing that “courts should invalidate restrictive cove-
nants that completely ban firearms in the home as violating constitutional rights and 
good public policy”). 
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the issue apparently had not been litigated,154 and the few com-
mentators to address it have generally concluded that such cov-
enants would be upheld.155 
D. Why It Matters 
The foregoing list is only a partial account of the ways in 
which law imposes incidental burdens on the right to keep and 
bear arms. Such burdens also arise in areas as diverse as em-
ployment law156 and zoning.157 The breadth and diversity of this 
regulatory environment demonstrate that gun regulation is sur-
prisingly pervasive. This does not mean that gun-related activi-
ties are burdened by incidental regulations to the same degree 
or in the same manner as speech,158 nor that constitutional chal-
lenges to such regulations would or should succeed. What this 
account does show is that common law, statutory law, incidental 
burdens, and gun-related activities are deeply interwoven in dy-
namic and unacknowledged ways and that this relationship has 
important practical, political, and theoretical implications. 
First, a great deal of gun regulation happens outside the 
glare of the gun control debate, and a full discussion of the regu-
latory landscape must account for that fact. For supporters of 
 
 154 See, for example, Christopher J. Wahl, Keeping Heller Out of the Home: Homeown-
ers Associations and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 U Pa J Const L 1003, 1003 (2013). 
 155 See, for example, Boudreaux, 20 U Fla J L & Pub Pol at 526 (cited in note 148); 
Wahl, 15 U Pa J Const L at 1036 (cited in note 154) (“Time will tell how far the looming 
penumbra of Heller will reach, but for now the narrow slice of our legal system occupied 
by HOAs remains fertile soil on which to experiment with limits on our right to keep and 
bear arms.”). 
 156 Plaintiffs occasionally invoke the right to bear arms in the course of challenging 
a termination of employment. See Perry v State Civil Service Commission, 38 A3d 942, 
954–55 (Pa Commw 2011) (involving an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a termination 
by raising the right to bear arms as a defense); Winters v Concentra Health Services, Inc, 
2008 WL 803134, *4–5 (Conn Super) (same); Bastible v Weyerhaeuser Co, 437 F3d 999, 
1004–08 (10th Cir 2006) (same); Hansen v America Online, Inc, 96 P3d 950, 953 (Utah 
2004) (same). But see Mitchell v University of Kentucky, 366 SW3d 895, 903 (Ky 2012) 
(finding that an employee’s termination based on firearm possession at work was contra-
ry to the right to bear arms). 
 157 The most prominent gun-zoning case involved a direct rather than an incidental 
burden, but the issue could easily arise under a “neutral” zoning regulation. See Ezell v 
City of Chicago, 651 F3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir 2011) (invalidating a law that required 
gun owners to spend one hour at a gun range but also prohibited the construction of such 
ranges within city limits). 
 158 See Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech 
and Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings L J 921, 933 (1993) (“The entire corpus juris, from 
the general common law of contracts, property, and torts to the most particular tax regu-
lation, affects what gets said, by whom, to whom, and to what effect.”). 
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gun control frustrated by what they see as a lack of political will, 
the forms of liability discussed above are tried-and-true legal 
tools that can be used to regulate the possession and use of guns 
while perhaps avoiding the negative political connotations of 
“gun control.” For supporters of gun rights, the enumeration of 
these rules might be a cause for alarm and a reason to support 
progun legislation that would abrogate the traditional rules and 
expand legal immunity for gun owners. 
Second, many of these rules—property and tort laws, for ex-
ample—provide the basis for legally enforceable private ordering 
with regard to guns. In law and economics terms, the rules put 
one person in the position of either paying to stop a gun-related 
activity, paying to permit a gun-related activity, or paying for 
the consequence of some gun-related activity. Such “private gun 
control,” enforced through civil suits rather than through crimi-
nal sanctions, raises novel and important issues for the Second 
Amendment and for the gun debate more generally. By minimiz-
ing the government’s role, it lays bare the ways in which inter-
ests in gun possession interact with other important private in-
terests like personal safety or compensation for injury. 
Third, and relatedly, these incidental burdens are likely to 
be especially important in jurisdictions where courts and legisla-
tures have eliminated traditional gun control. The rollback of 
state gun control laws magnifies the significance of private or-
dering, as individuals fill the regulatory void by negotiating with 
one another regarding guns and their use. These negotiations, in 
turn, occur against a background of sometimes-conflicting legal 
entitlements—exclusion versus reasonable access, quiet enjoy-
ment versus free use of property, and so on. Gun control of this 
type is an inevitable part of the legal landscape and raises diffi-
cult questions of common and statutory law. 
Fourth, the nature of the gun-neutral regulations dis-
cussed here helps demonstrate the baseline-shifting effect of 
the progun laws that some states have recently adopted. Even 
age-old common-law principles like negligence and the right to 
exclude must be read in conjunction with contemporary statutes. 
And some of those statutes have a major impact, either by grant-
ing outright statutory immunity to traditional rules159 or by 
changing the warp and woof of common-law principles. Georgia’s 
recent “carry anywhere” law, for example, appears to limit private 
 
 159 See generally, for example, PLCAA, 119 Stat 2095. 
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business owners’ rights to exclude guns.160 States that preempt 
local gun-safety measures (for example, municipal prohibitions 
on guns in public parks) might thereby undermine torts that are 
predicated on a duty that tracks the abrogated local regulation 
(for example, a duty to keep firearms away from places where 
children congregate). 
Fifth, while the breadth of incidental burdens on the ability 
to keep and bear arms may be substantial, many of the general-
ly applicable laws discussed here contain their own safety valves 
that might be used to shield gun-related activities without resort 
to the Second Amendment. The reasonable-access requirement 
limits the right to exclude, for example, and self-defense law 
could do the same for assault. The basic canons of constitutional 
avoidance161 and respect for the common law162 suggest that 
courts should avail themselves of these tools when possible. 
Sixth, many of the incidental burdens discussed here incor-
porate community standards and social practices, thereby 
providing a method by which popular understandings become 
legal rules. Nuisance law, for instance, takes account of what 
kinds of activities are appropriate and reasonable in a given con-
text and hence permits different kinds of gun usage in different 
areas. For example, backyard target practice might constitute a 
nuisance in the suburbs but not in the country. The legal stand-
ard for IIED, too, incorporates an objective inquiry into the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiff ’s asserted harm. As a result, it inevi-
tably depends on popular views—which vary from place to 
place—about appropriate gun usage. This kind of local tailoring 
is not only constitutionally permissible but is in some cases 
normatively desirable.163 
Finally, our hope is to help reframe the gun debate away 
from its narrow focus on gun control and toward a broader eval-
uation of the regulation of gun-related activities. Although much 
of our analysis will probably appeal to gun-rights supporters, 
 
 160 Safe Carry Protection Act, 1 Ga Laws 601 (2014). 
 161 See Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371, 380–81 (2005) (“[W]hen deciding which of two 
plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary conse-
quences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, 
the other should prevail.”). 
 162 See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U Chi L 
Rev 782, 792–95 (1986) (criticizing the development of the “actual malice” rule and argu-
ing for a return to the common law of libel and strict liability). 
 163 See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L J 82, 133 (2013) (arguing that 
Second Amendment doctrine “can and should be tailored to better reflect the urban/rural 
divide”).  
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this theme in particular should also interest gun control advo-
cates. Neutral background norms concerning firearms are the 
rule, not the exception. By highlighting the ubiquity of well-
established gun-neutral doctrines from various areas of law, this 
Article helps break through what appears to be a pathological 
legislative dysfunction arising when any regulation, no matter 
how popular or long-standing, is labeled “gun control.” 
II.  THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
The story of the Second Amendment is, increasingly, a story 
of its boundaries.164 Heller and the two-part test that predomi-
nates in the courts of appeals rely heavily on threshold determi-
nations about which arms, people, and activities are constitu-
tionally covered.165 What Professor Frederick Schauer has said of 
the First Amendment is therefore equally true of the Second 
Amendment: “[Q]uestions about the involvement of the [ ] 
Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequen-
tial than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection 
that the [ ] Amendment affords the [activities] to which it ap-
plies.”166 Indeed, such threshold inquires appear increasingly 
important throughout constitutional rights law, as many of the 
justices express a preference for categorical tests rather than for 
the familiar tiers of scrutiny.167 
One way to identify a constitutional right’s boundaries is by 
reference to the kinds of burdens on individual choice that war-
rant constitutional scrutiny. This is a harder question than it 
 
 164 See Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1765 (cited in note 1) (“The history of the First 
Amendment is the history of its boundaries.”). 
 165 See, for example, United States v Marzzarella, 614 F3d 85, 89 (3d Cir 2010): 
As we read Heller, it suggests a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment 
challenges. First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on con-
duct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. . . . If it 
does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some 
form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is 
constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid. 
See also, for example, Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 NYU L Rev 375, 380 (2009) (noting that the Heller majority 
endorsed a categorical test under which “some types of ‘Arms’ and arms-usage are pro-
tected absolutely from bans and some types of ‘Arms’ and people are excluded entirely 
from constitutional coverage”). 
 166 Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 1). 
 167 See, for example, United States v Stevens, 559 US 460, 471–72 (2010) (holding 
that “crush videos” and other depictions of animal cruelty are not one of the “categories 
of speech . . . fully outside the protection of the First Amendment”); Brown v Entertain-
ment Merchants Association, 131 S Ct 2729, 2733–35 (2011).  
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might seem, because not all burdens on constitutionally enu-
merated activities—speech and free exercise of religion, for ex-
ample—raise constitutional concerns. Some burdens, whether 
direct or incidental, simply fall outside the Constitution’s scope; 
they lack constitutional salience.168 
In part because it is so heavily categorical,169 in part because 
it is so new, and in part because it so frequently bumps up 
against neutral laws of general applicability,170 the right to keep 
and bear arms presents a unique opportunity to explore these 
broad constitutional issues. Is the Second Amendment due for 
its own version of Employment Division v Smith,171 insulating 
gun-neutral regulations from constitutional review?172 
This is a question about both the Second Amendment and 
the boundaries of the Constitution itself. On one level, our goal 
is to help judges, lawyers, and scholars determine which bur-
dens on firearms should be subject to Second Amendment scru-
tiny.173 At a more general level, our project is to identify the ana-
lytic tools that are useful for demarcating the boundary between 
constitutional rights and other forms of law. That border is par-
ticularly important because, given the supremacy of constitu-
tional law over other sources of law, any intrusion by non-
constitutional law on the Constitution’s side of the border will 
subject that law to constitutional scrutiny, if not invalidation.174 
Indeed, disputes as to the location of this border generate a 
large share of litigation over constitutional rights. 
 
 168 See generally Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev 1765 (cited in note 1). 
 169 See Blocher, 84 NYU L Rev at 405–11 (cited in note 165) (describing the 
“originalist categoricalism” of the Heller majority).  
 170 See Part I. 
 171 494 US 872 (1990).  
 172 In Smith, the Court held that criminal laws prohibiting the use of peyote did not 
violate the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Id at 878–79. As Justice 
Antonin Scalia wrote: “[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground 
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).” Id at 879 (quotation marks omitted). 
 173 Providing the tools is about as specific as we can get—to apply them thoroughly 
to any of the incidental burdens discussed above would require at least another article’s 
worth of analysis. See, for example, Wahl, 15 U Pa J Const L at 1024–35 (cited in note 
154) (exploring the constitutionality of HOA servitudes that ban handgun possession in 
homes). 
 174 See US Const Art VI, cl 2.  
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A. Direct Burdens 
Some gun control laws—like some regulations of other 
rights175—impose direct burdens on the keeping and bearing of 
arms by targeting those activities as such. These laws are what 
people typically have in mind when they refer to gun control: 
regulations that specifically govern the use, possession, sale, and 
manufacture of firearms. The laws challenged in Heller and 
McDonald v City of Chicago, Illinois176 were unusual in their 
stringency but otherwise representative of such direct regula-
tions. Understanding the constitutional status of direct burdens 
is a useful first step toward understanding the constitutional sa-
lience of incidental burdens. 
As a prima facie matter, direct regulations would all seem to 
be subject to the Second Amendment, no matter how minimal 
the impact they impose. After all, by definition they burden 
what the Constitution, by its very terms, protects: the keeping 
and bearing of arms. Perhaps not all these burdens should count 
as “infringing” this right, but one might think that at the very 
least they should be subject to scrutiny. In other words, it seems 
reasonable to think that direct burdens would be subject to Se-
cond Amendment coverage.177 
As a doctrinal matter, however, courts have held to the con-
trary. Some direct regulations are not only constitutional but ac-
tually fall entirely outside the scope of the Second Amendment. 
With regard to such uncovered forms of gun control, the 
Amendment does not show up at all. Thus, a short-barreled 
shotgun can be banned not because the relevant degree of scru-
tiny is satisfied but rather because “the Second Amendment 
does not protect those weapons.”178 
This kind of categoricalism is particularly pronounced in Se-
cond Amendment doctrine but is not unique to it. Some direct 
regulations of what an ordinary speaker of English would de-
scribe as speech, for example, are generally not subject to any 
 
 175 See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv L Rev 
1175, 1176–77 (1996) (noting that “the government sometimes singles out protected activi-
ty for disadvantageous treatment” and referring to these actions as “direct burdens”). 
 176 561 US 742 (2010). 
 177 See Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1769 (cited in note 1) (discussing how, in the 
context of the First Amendment, some activities may not be prohibited but nevertheless 
must pass additional scrutiny). 
 178 Heller, 554 US at 625. 
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First Amendment scrutiny. For example, securities fraud,179 
child pornography,180 and obscenity181 are usually182 not treated 
as “speech” for constitutional purposes. And those exclusions, in 
turn, have been explained on many different grounds, including 
the low value of the speech involved,183 the weight of the gov-
ernment’s interest,184 and the history of the prohibition.185 
The Second Amendment similarly carves out some direct 
regulations from constitutional coverage, and it does so (or at 
least claims to do so) primarily based on whether the regulations 
are long-standing. Those with a long historical lineage—
preferably all the way to the Founding,186 though most judges 
will be satisfied with less187—are exempted from Second 
 
 179 See, for example, United States Securities and Exchange Commission v Pirate 
Investor LLC, 580 F3d 233, 255 (4th Cir 2009) (“Punishing fraud, whether it be common 
law fraud or securities fraud, simply does not violate the First Amendment.”). 
 180 See, for example, New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 764 (1982).  
 181 See, for example, Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973). 
 182 The modifier is necessary because even these categories might be able to claim 
First Amendment protection if, for example, they were subject to viewpoint-discriminatory 
regulation. See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 US 377, 418 (1992): 
It is true that loud speech in favor of the Republican Party can be regulated be-
cause it is loud, but not because it is pro-Republican; and it is true that the 
public burning of the American flag can be regulated because it involves public 
burning and not because it involves the flag. 
 183 See, for example, Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571–72 (1942): 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti-
tutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene. . . . It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality. 
(citation omitted). 
 184 See, for example, Ferber, 458 US at 761 (noting that child pornography is not 
subject to the Miller obscenity test because of the state’s strong interest in protecting ex-
ploited children and in prosecuting those who promote such exploitation). 
 185 See, for example, R.A.V., 505 US at 382–83 (noting that, “[f]rom 1791 to the pre-
sent,” the United States has “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech” and that 
“the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limita-
tions” on, for example, obscenity, defamation, or fighting words). 
 186 See, for example, Ezell v City of Chicago, 651 F3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir 2011) 
(“[I]f the government can establish that a challenged firearms law regulates activity fall-
ing outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the rele-
vant historical moment—1791 or 1868—then the analysis can stop there.”). 
 187 See, for example, National Rifle Association of America, Inc v Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F3d 185, 204 (5th Cir 2012) (upholding re-
strictions on selling firearms to eighteen-year-olds). 
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Amendment scrutiny no matter how significant the burdens 
they place on regulated parties. 
Heller itself is exemplary in this regard. After dispensing 
with the militia clause as “prefatory” and not a limit on the se-
cond, “operative” clause, the majority said that it would “start [ ] 
with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is 
exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”188 Later, 
however, the Court took a notable turn, concluding that some 
laws, people, purposes, and weapons fall completely outside the 
scope of the Second Amendment: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifica-
tions on the commercial sale of arms.189 
So, despite what many gun-rights advocates urge as a clear tex-
tual command to protect all “people” and “arms” and “bearing,” 
the opinion makes equally clear that some people (“felons and 
the mentally ill”190), some kinds of guns (“weapons not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”191), and 
some gun-related activities (“any sort of confrontation”192) are 
categorically excluded from the scope of the Amendment. 
The majority suggested that these exceptions were embed-
ded in the meaning of the text at the time it was ratified.193 But 
scholars and judges, even those sympathetic to Heller’s basic 
conclusion, have noted that there is scanty Founding-era sup-
port for Heller’s carveouts.194 The federal ban on possession by 
felons, for example, did not exist until 1938 and did not extend 
 
 188 Heller, 554 US at 580–81. 
 189 Id at 626–27. 
 190 Id at 626. See also id at 644 (Stevens dissenting) (“[W]hen it finally drills down 
on the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected 
class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”). 
 191 Id at 625. See also id at 627 (“[T]he sorts of weapons protected [by the Second 
Amendment] were those ‘in common use at the time.’”). 
 192 Heller, 554 US at 595. 
 193 Id at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were un-
derstood to have when the people adopted them.”). 
 194 See, for example, Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist 
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L Rev 1343, 1357–58 (2009) (noting that there is an “absence of 
historical support” for Scalia’s claim that supposedly long-standing prohibitions are con-
sistent with the preexisting right to bear arms). 
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to all felons until 1968.195 Prior to 1961, there were no specific 
federal prohibitions on carrying a loaded gun onto an airplane—
which is unquestionably a “sensitive place.”196 Unless courts con-
strue Founding-era regulations at a higher level of abstrac-
tion,197 shorten the length of time for regulations to be consid-
ered long-standing, or both, few modern regulations will find 
indisputable support in Founding-era law. 
Nevertheless, a history-based categorical approach to direct 
regulations has become an essential part of the post-Heller 
analysis. In the wake of Heller, most courts have adopted a two-
part test for evaluating Second Amendment claims,198 the first 
part of which asks whether a particular claim falls within the 
Amendment’s scope.199 That threshold inquiry into the Amend-
ment’s boundaries is grounded in history. Long-standing regula-
tions are categorically excluded from the Second Amendment’s 
scope, although courts continue to debate the length of time and 
the level of abstraction that are required for a regulation to be 
considered long-standing.200 
Bans on concealed carry are a good example of this kind of 
analysis. Heller suggests that such regulations—which undoubt-
edly impose direct burdens on the keeping and bearing of arms—
are constitutional due to historical practice: “[T]he majority of the 
 
 195 See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv J L & 
Pub Pol 695, 698–99, 735 (2009). See also Lund, 56 UCLA L Rev at 1357 n 33 (cited in 
note 194) (“Even limited bans on the possession of concealable weapons by violent felons 
were apparently not adopted until well into the twentieth century.”). 
 196 Act of Sept 5, 1961, Pub L No 87-197, 75 Stat 466.  
 197 The Court has already engaged in this level-of-abstraction inquiry with regard to 
the weapons that are covered by the Second Amendment. A modern nine-millimeter 
handgun is materially different in operation, accuracy, and lethality than an eighteenth-
century musket, but confining the Second Amendment to only the latter, according to the 
Court, would “border[ ] on the frivolous.” Heller, 554 US at 582.  
 198 See, for example, United States v Greeno, 679 F3d 510, 518 (6th Cir 2012); Heller 
v District of Columbia, 670 F3d 1244, 1252–53 (DC Cir 2011); Ezell, 651 F3d at 701–04; 
United States v Chester, 628 F3d 673, 680 (4th Cir 2010); United States v Reese, 627 F3d 
792, 800–01 (10th Cir 2010); Marzzarella, 614 F3d at 89. 
 199 If that threshold question is answered in the affirmative, then the second part of 
the test asks whether the challenged regulation can be justified in light of the burden 
that it imposes on protected conduct—an inquiry that is largely guided by interest bal-
ancing, which is discussed below.  
 200 Compare National Rifle Association, 700 F3d at 206 (noting that “categorically 
restricting the presumptive Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds does not vio-
late the central concern of the Second Amendment” because such restrictions are analo-
gous to regulations on firearms in the hands of the mentally ill and felons), with Nation-
al Rifle Association, Inc v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 714 F3d 
334, 339 (5th Cir 2013) (Jones dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) (criticizing 
“[t]he panel’s resort to generalized history” to uphold the regulation). 
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19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibi-
tions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Se-
cond Amendment or state analogues.”201 Lower courts facing 
challenges to concealed-carry regulations have overwhelmingly 
agreed, holding that such prohibitions are so well entrenched 
that they are not subject to scrutiny of any kind. On this read-
ing, concealed carrying simply does not constitute keeping or 
bearing arms for Second Amendment purposes. 
Although Heller and the two-part test both emphasize histo-
ry in exempting direct regulations from constitutional scrutiny, 
it seems likely that some form of prudentialism or interest bal-
ancing plays a role, even if only implicitly.202 Although the Court 
has recently tried to suggest otherwise, First Amendment juris-
prudence has often employed interest balancing when defining 
the boundaries of free speech.203 Categories like child pornogra-
phy, for example, are often said to fall outside the scope of the 
First Amendment in part because they are so harmful and worth 
so little.204 It is not hard to imagine that the same kind of rea-
soning lies behind intuitions and judicial decisions that exclude 
from Second Amendment coverage certain arms that have the 
potential to inflict indiscriminate carnage and that are “of such 
slight social value as a step to” self-defense that banning them 
need not satisfy even low levels of constitutional scrutiny.205 
 
 201 Heller, 554 US at 626 (providing an example of the historically limited nature of 
the Second Amendment right). 
 202 This, too, is a common practice in constitutional rights law. See generally Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Post-liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U Colo 
L Rev 293 (1992). 
 203 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amend-
ment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Cal L Rev 935, 938–39 
(1968) (describing the Court’s practice of “ad hoc balancing” of competing interests in 
First Amendment jurisprudence). See also Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value 
Speech, 128 Harv L Rev 2166, 2197–2211 (2015) (challenging the historical claims that 
the Court has recently made to support its exclusions of low-value speech). 
 204 See, for example, Ferber, 458 US at 762 (“The value of permitting live perfor-
mances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”). In recent cases, the Court has characterized the 
First Amendment’s exemptions as being grounded in history rather than in cost-benefit 
analysis. See, for example, Stevens, 559 US at 471. This seems, at the very least, to rep-
resent a substantial shift in the Court’s jurisprudence. See Randy J. Kozel, Second 
Thoughts about the First Amendment *3–4 (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/BH24-SQ35.  
 205 Chaplinsky, 315 US at 572 (noting that lewd and obscene utterances are “no essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality”). Heller suggests that the constitutionality of these bans is rooted in 
tradition. Heller, 554 US at 627 (concluding that Miller’s limitations are supported by the 
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However the courts come to construct the categories—
whether from historical lineage, analogical reasoning from his-
torical precedent, or interest balancing—the point is that some 
direct burdens on the right to keep and bear arms do not even 
raise constitutional questions. Prohibitions on concealed carry-
ing or possession by felons, for example, impose burdens that 
are both direct and, for the people they reach, quite significant. 
But Second Amendment challenges to those prohibitions founder 
at the threshold. Despite the directness or severity of the bur-
dens they impose, such laws are exempt from constitutional 
scrutiny. 
B. Incidental Burdens 
As described above, Second Amendment doctrine has devel-
oped rules for determining the constitutional salience of direct 
burdens on the right to keep and bear arms. But as of yet, courts 
have identified few tools to determine when incidental burdens 
raise Second Amendment concerns. Supplying those tools is an 
increasingly unavoidable task. Prior to Heller, some gun owners 
and manufacturers challenged incidental burdens on Second 
Amendment grounds. These challenges largely failed.206 But af-
ter Heller, such claims cannot be so easily dismissed. And as a 
practical matter, they are likely to arise more often in jurisdic-
tions where courts and legislatures have rolled back—for politi-
cal or constitutional reasons—conventional forms of gun control. 
When direct regulations are stripped away, the underlying 
structure of incidental burdens becomes more relevant. When 
public carrying is decriminalized, for example, courts are more 
likely to face the question of when publicly carrying a firearm is 
a public nuisance or a disturbance of the peace. 
Such questions are new to the Second Amendment but not 
to constitutional law. Religious exercise and free expression, for 
example, often encounter incidental legal burdens, raising the 
questions of when and how those burdens are subject to First 
 
“historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons”) 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 206 See, for example, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v 
AcuSport, Inc, 271 F Supp 2d 435, 462 (EDNY 2003) (“There is no justification in the 
federal Constitution for private persons failing to exercise reasonable care in meeting 
their legal responsibility to help ensure a safe society.”); City of Gary, Indiana v Smith & 
Wesson Corp, 801 NE2d 1222, 1235 (Ind 2003) (finding that state constitutional protec-
tion of the right to keep and bear arms did not bar a suit for nuisance). 
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Amendment scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s efforts to mediate 
these encounters between constitutional and nonconstitutional 
law have created well-known and in some cases quite controver-
sial doctrines, from Smith207 to Marsh v Alabama.208 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, especially the law of regu-
latory takings, also provides lessons on how incidental burdens 
can implicate constitutional rights. In takings doctrine, courts 
are required to determine when a regulation that is not specifi-
cally designed to take private property should nonetheless be 
treated as having done so. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that “[g]overnment hardly could go on” if every burden on prop-
erty rights constituted a taking,209 but it has also noted that 
burdens can sometimes go “too far.”210 To identify the situations 
in which constitutional rules must apply, the Court has com-
bined bright-line rules and interest balancing, just as lower 
courts have done with regard to gun rights. Thus, for example, 
any permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a reg-
ulatory taking no matter how minor the cost,211 and any total dep-
rivation of a property’s value counts as a taking no matter how 
strong the government’s interest.212 In addition to those bright-
line rules, courts also consider a regulation’s cost, interference 
with “investment-backed expectations,” and “character.”213 
We do not attempt here to synthesize the rules regarding re-
ligious exercise, freedom of expression, and takings into a 
transsubstantive approach for evaluating the constitutional sali-
ence of incidental burdens.214 Instead, our aim is to look to those 
rules for guidance on similar questions surrounding the keeping 
and bearing of arms.215 Drawing on lessons from other constitu-
tional rights, we identify four main forms of argument that are 
relevant to the question whether a given incidental burden 
should be subject to heightened scrutiny. These modalities are 
 
 207 Smith, 494 US at 874, 882–84 (demonstrating the tension between eligibility for 
state unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion).  
 208 326 US 501, 503–04 (1946) (addressing the tension between a state antitrespass 
statute and the free exercise of religion).  
 209 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922).  
 210 Id at 415.  
 211 See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419, 426 (1982).  
 212 See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015–16 (1992). 
 213 Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1978). 
 214 For the leading effort along these lines, see generally Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev 1175 
(cited in note 175). 
 215 See generally Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 
Mich L Rev 459 (2010). 
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tools with which judges, lawyers, and scholars can determine 
whether a particular burden raises constitutional concerns. 
The first of these argumentative forms is history and tradi-
tion. As noted above, certain long-standing direct burdens on 
guns are exempt from constitutional scrutiny, and the same 
should be true for long-standing incidental burdens.216 A reliance 
on tradition helps explain why, for example, the right to keep 
and bear arms is not violated by the equally fundamental and 
long-standing right to exclude an unwanted visitor from one’s 
private property. The latter right is, as one court recently put it, 
part of the “canvas” on which the Second Amendment was 
painted.217 
The second argument focuses on the consequences of the 
burden. Laws that impose substantial incidental burdens should 
be subject to scrutiny, but laws that impose minor incidental 
burdens should not. This is essentially the approach that Profes-
sor Michael Dorf advocates with regard to incidental burdens on 
the fundamental rights to free speech, free exercise, and equal 
protection,218 and it translates well to the context of guns. 
The third approach also focuses on consequences but for the 
system as a whole rather than for the individual. Applying Se-
cond Amendment scrutiny to neutral laws like trespass, assault, 
and negligence raises serious structural questions about state 
action, federalism, and the proper role of courts. When adjudica-
tion threatens to disrupt these settled matters of institutional 
design, courts should be more hesitant to apply Second Amend-
ment scrutiny. 
The fourth consideration is the purpose or design of the regu-
lation. Some burdens, though nominally incidental, operate like 
direct regulations and should be treated as such. Some regula-
tions might be facially gun neutral but intended to deter gun-
related activities—the replacement of DC’s safe-storage law with a 
substantively identical negligence standard is an example.219 Simi-
larly, some gun-neutral legal rules—for example, those that are 
more punitive than compensatory—might serve public interests 
 
 216 See notes 186–89, 200, and accompanying text. 
 217 GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc v Georgia, 687 F3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir 2012). 
 218 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1223–33 (cited in note 175). 
 219 DC Code § 7-2507.02 
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rather than interests in private ordering or restorative justice.220 
Such regulatory torts are more likely to implicate the Constitution. 
As in other areas of law, these factors interact in complicat-
ed ways. An incidental burden’s provenance might well trump 
the significance of its impact on individuals, just as a direct bur-
den’s longevity can exempt it from constitutional scrutiny even if 
it amounts to a complete prohibition on gun possession (felon-in-
possession statutes, for example). Through repeated application, 
some factors might calcify into rules. Just as a permanent physi-
cal invasion constitutes a per se regulatory taking, so too the ab-
rogation of a necessity defense to a trespass action might consti-
tute a per se Second Amendment violation. Nevertheless, the 
basic proposition bears repeating: the fact that an incidental 
burden warrants Second Amendment scrutiny says very little 
about whether the incidental burden actually violates the Se-
cond Amendment. These tools of analysis simply help a court as-
sess whether the Second Amendment should even apply to the 
incidental burden under consideration. 
1. Text, history, and long-standing incidental burdens. 
In answering any constitutional question, the standard 
place to begin is with the text of the document.221 And, more of-
ten than not, the meaning of that text is created, informed, or 
demonstrated by history.222 Reliance on text and history is there-
fore among the most fundamental tools in constitutional analy-
sis223 and currently plays a particularly prominent role in Second 
 
 220 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 Georgetown L J 513, 
518–24 (2003).  
 221 See, for example, City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 519 (1997) (stating that 
when interpreting the Constitution, “we begin with its text”). See also Joseph Story, 1 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a Preliminary Review of the 
Constitutional Histories of the Colonies and States before the Adoption of the Constitution 
§ 451 at 345 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1891) (Melville M. Bigelow, ed): 
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for nice-
ties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for 
the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. . . . The people 
make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them, 
with the help of common-sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any 
recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss. 
 222 See Eugene Volokh, Textualism and District of Columbia v. Heller, 37 Harv J L 
& Pub Pol 729, 730 (2014) (“To the extent that you’re going to be a textualist, you ought 
to be an originalist.”).  
 223 Professor Bobbitt treats text and history as distinct modalities. See Bobbitt, Con-
stitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution at 7–8 (cited in note 32). We certainly have no 
quarrel with that distinction as a conceptual matter, particularly for textual provisions 
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Amendment doctrine.224 These same tools can provide some 
guidance—but rarely a clear answer225—as to the specific ques-
tion whether incidental burdens should be subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny. 
The text of the Second Amendment says that the right to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Founding-era dic-
tionaries, assuming that they are reliable226 or even relevant,227 
define “infringe” as “to violate, intrude, or invade the property or 
privilege of another.”228 The notion of “infringement” seems to 
assume some kind of boundary and can be thought of as binary: 
either a regulation infringes on a right or it does not. There are 
no partial infringements. Textually, “infringe” appears to mean 
something different than, for example, “abridge,” which (again, 
assuming reliability and relevance) means “to contract, dimin-
ish, or cut short.”229 
Applying this textual analysis to incidental burdens on the 
keeping and bearing of arms seems straightforward: As with di-
rect burdens, incidental burdens—either accepted by the 
Amendment’s text or well established in history—should be ex-
empt from constitutional scrutiny. In other words, the boundaries 
 
whose language is relatively clear to the average person on the street. But in the particu-
lar context of the Second Amendment, text and history are almost impossible to sepa-
rate. Heller itself is often described as the Court’s most thoroughgoing originalist opin-
ion, and yet the majority structures its entire opinion around the text of the Amendment. 
See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Georgetown L J 657, 659 (2009). 
 224 See generally Miller, 122 Yale L J 852 (cited in note 30). 
 225 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 175).  
 226 See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: Popu-
lar Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 Yale J L & Humani-
ties 295, 298 (2011) (stating that early dictionaries “were idiosyncratic products of their 
authors, who often had ideological and political agendas”); Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of 
the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 
Duke L J 167, 192–93 (2010). 
 227 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier and Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: 
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 
Marq L Rev 77, 80 (2010) (“Unlike other points of reference for interpreting words and 
phrases—such as context, the stated or implied purpose of a phrase or enactment, drafts, 
legislative history, or other documents—dictionary definitions provide no context for the 
word or phrase being defined.”). 
 228 D. Bellamy, et al, A New Complete English Dictionary at “infringe” (printed for 
Fuller 2d ed 1760).  
 229 Id at “abridge.” See also US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”). The utility of this linguistic exercise is debatable. 
Some state Second Amendment analogues specify that the right to keep and bear arms 
“shall not be questioned.” Pa Const Art I, § 21. However, that appears to create either a 
nonjusticiable political question or an immunity from scrutiny that no constitution in a 
system with judicial review can tolerate.  
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of the Amendment’s text conform to the features of the common-
law and statutory norms that existed at the time of the Found-
ing, or to other features that have arisen from long use over 
time. If liability for negligence with a weapon, taxes on ammuni-
tion, or storage requirements for weapons are historically indi-
cated, then they cannot be “infringements,” because there is no 
corresponding right. From an originalist perspective, one might 
say that these incidental burdens were embedded in the mean-
ing of the text at the time that it was ratified, just as other con-
stitutional rights are “enshrined with the scope they were un-
derstood to have when the people adopted them.”230 This does not 
mean, however, that the precise contours of those burdens must 
be frozen in the late 1700s—it is perfectly coherent to say that the 
Second Amendment, as ratified, not only exempted negligence 
from coverage but also left to future courts (and perhaps even leg-
islatures) the power to change the definition of negligence.231 
Although the Second Amendment appears unique in the de-
gree of importance that it places on text and history,232 many con-
stitutional rights are defined at the margins by long-standing 
practice.233 For example, courts look to history to determine 
whether a given incidental burden raises constitutional prob-
lems.234 A key Fifth Amendment takings case, Lucas v South Car-
olina Coastal Council235 (authored, like Heller, by Scalia), holds 
that even total deprivation of a property’s value is not a regulato-
ry taking if the common law would have defined the property us-
age as a nuisance.236 In that scenario, there is no property for the 
government to take. Though there are important differences, the 
structure of this analysis is worth emphasizing: even if a well-
established background rule—an incidental burden, in other 
words—were to fully deprive a person of what he may consider 
his property, it would nonetheless be exempt from constitutional 
 
 230 Heller, 554 US at 634–35.  
 231 See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1813, 
1819–54 (2012); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi 
L Rev 877, 879 (1996) (describing, inter alia, “the rational traditionalism that is the most 
important part of common law constitutional interpretation”).  
 232 The Seventh Amendment is probably the closest competitor in this regard. See 
Miller, 122 Yale L J at 872 (cited in note 30).  
 233 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 234 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1186–87 (cited in note 175).  
 235 505 US 1003 (1992). 
 236 Id at 1029.  
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scrutiny because the burden would not be a taking of property 
as the Constitution uses those terms. 
The same is likely true in the Second Amendment context, in 
which the history and boundaries of the Second Amendment ap-
pear to be mutually constitutive. Sometimes the implications are 
straightforward enough. Rules against negligence, trespass, and 
nuisance are as traditional and long-standing as any legal prohi-
bitions can be.237 Therefore, like analogous direct burdens, they 
should be strongly insulated from constitutional scrutiny and also 
insulated from facial challenges. Of course, in a given case, even 
these rules might impose such a burden238 or be applied in such a 
fashion239 as to give rise to an as-applied challenge. 
Consider a concrete illustration. In a recent case involving a 
Second Amendment challenge to the ability of churches to ex-
clude armed parishioners, the Eleventh Circuit explained that 
“property law, tort law, and criminal law provide the canvas on 
which our Founding Fathers drafted the Second Amendment.”240 
The court held that “[a] clear grasp of this background illus-
trates that the pre-existing right codified in the Second Amend-
ment does not include protection for a right to carry a firearm in 
a place of worship against the owner’s wishes.”241 This is a 
straightforward application of the principle that traditional in-
cidental burdens—imposed through “property law, tort law, and 
criminal law”—are not subject to Second Amendment scrutiny.242 
This is not to say that the question will always be straight-
forward or the answer easy to explain. Why are property and 
tort the canvas for the Second Amendment and not the other 
way around? Both are undoubtedly fundamental, as the Elev-
enth Circuit recognized,243 and it is hard to say—at least given 
the logic of Heller—that one or the other is more deeply rooted in 
 
 237 See Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 163–68 (cited in note 60) (discussing tres-
pass); id at 169–73 (discussing nuisance); William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 331–32 (Cavendish 2001) (Wayne Morrison, ed) (originally published 
1765) (discussing a master’s duty to answer for his servant’s negligence). 
 238 See Part II.B.2. 
 239 See Part II.B.4.  
 240 GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F3d at 1264. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. The court had no cause to consider whether a prosecution for running into a 
church with a firearm to defend individuals under attack would be unconstitutional. 
That kind of self-defense exception is as much built into the as-applied challenge as is a 
felon picking up a pistol in an emergency.  
 243 See id. 
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the American constitutional system. A great deal turns on the 
framing issue, and it often goes unexplained. 
One of the dissents in Heller, for example, pointed out that 
safety regulations in major colonial cities like Boston and 
Philadelphia prohibited people from storing gunpowder in their 
homes or from carrying loaded firearms into houses, stores, 
shops, stables, or barns.244 This dissent held out these regula-
tions as solid evidence that DC’s safe-storage requirement 
should be upheld, or that it at least should be read to incorpo-
rate a self-defense exception.245 But the majority demurred, con-
cluding that the historical regulations were isolated and minor 
in their severity (“akin to . . . speeding or jaywalking”) and, in 
any event, that they “would [not] be enforced” against someone 
violating the statute in self-defense.246 What can explain the dif-
ference? Why is property law part of the canvas on which the 
Second Amendment was drafted, but the gunpowder regulations 
are not? Similarly, why was self-defense assumed to be part of 
the canvas for the colonial gunpowder restrictions but not for 
DC’s safe-storage law?247 
Consider, too, Heller’s treatment of the phrase “right of the 
people.” As noted above, the majority suggests that the phrase in-
cludes “all Americans,”248 but “when it finally drills down on the 
substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits 
the protected class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”249 Heller 
is not unique in this regard. Justices, judges, scholars, lawyers, 
and politicians often transform the Amendment’s phrase “the 
 
 244 Heller, 554 US at 684–85 (Breyer dissenting). Whether gunpowder-storage regu-
lations are incidental or direct burdens on the right to keep and bear arms is debatable, 
but the point is the same either way. 
 245 Id at 692 (Breyer dissenting).  
 246 Id at 633–34. 
 247 See id at 692 (Breyer dissenting) (“I am puzzled by the majority’s unwillingness 
to adopt a similar approach. It readily reads unspoken self-defense exceptions into every 
colonial law, but it refuses to accept the District’s concession that this law has one.”). 
 248 Heller, 554 US at 581. 
 249 Id at 644 (Stevens dissenting). See also id at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment 
does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”). 
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people” into “law-abiding citizens,”250 just as they slip in the 
word “lawful” before “Arms.”251 
This raises a fundamental question: What is the law that 
one must abide by in order to fall within the scope of the Second 
Amendment? It seems unlikely that the answer is gun control 
law itself—after all, the point of a Second Amendment challenge 
is to say that such laws are not constitutionally lawful. Rather, 
it seems that “law-abiding citizens” are worthy of Second 
Amendment coverage because they abide by other laws—
regulations that do not target guns as such. Those who fail to 
abide by such laws are not law-abiding and are therefore not 
“the people” who fall within the Amendment’s scope. 
This means that these gun-neutral laws impose incidental 
burdens on the Second Amendment—indeed, they define the 
very scope of Second Amendment rights. Consider a person con-
victed of a non-gun-related felony like securities fraud. Federal 
law forbids him to own a firearm.252 The latter of these prohibi-
tions is, on its face, a direct regulation of the right to keep and 
bear arms, but not as it applies to him. The logic of Heller is not 
that the latter regulation survives scrutiny because of his earlier 
conviction, but rather that no scrutiny applies because the felo-
ny conviction for securities fraud removes him from the ambit of 
constitutional coverage. The regulation’s impact on the right to 
keep and bear arms is significant but incidental. One can do the 
same exercise for any class of people—for example, felons,253 the 
mentally ill,254 and undocumented immigrants (at least in one 
circuit)255—who are denied the right to keep and bear arms on 
the basis of a gun-neutral legal status. 
 
 250 See, for example, Jake Miller, Ted Cruz Talks Guns, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Obamacare with Jay Leno (CBS News, Nov 9, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/XQV3 
-HDJW (quoting Senator Ted Cruz as arguing that Congress should increase the re-
sources devoted to prosecuting violations rather than “try to take away the constitutional 
rights of law-abiding citizens”). 
 251 See, for example, Norman v State, 159 S3d 205, 214 (Fla App 2015) (discussing 
whether “the Legislature may [ ] impose some restrictions and conditions on either the 
method or manner that lawful arms may be carried outside the home”). 
 252 See Marshall, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 695 (cited in note 195). 
 253 See Heller, 554 US at 626. 
 254 See id. 
 255 See United States v Portillo-Munoz, 643 F3d 437, 442 (5th Cir 2011) (finding that 
an undocumented immigrant does not have Second Amendment rights). But see Britt v 
State, 681 SE2d 320, 322–23 (NC 2009) (upholding an as-applied challenge to a felon-in-
possession statute brought under a state analogue to the Second Amendment). 
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In such cases, facially gun-neutral laws have a massive im-
pact on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms256 and yet 
are not subject to constitutional scrutiny. In fact, they are the 
very reason that such scrutiny does not apply. This seems to run 
counter to the approach, described by Dorf and others, suggest-
ing that incidental burdens on constitutional rights should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny when they impose significant 
burdens on protected conduct. How can law have such a funda-
mental practical impact on the Second Amendment’s scope and 
yet be immune from Second Amendment scrutiny? How can neu-
tral laws escape constitutional review when defining a right but 
not when burdening it? 
The answer lies in part with normative and interpretive 
commitments regarding the value of tradition. Incidental bur-
dens could be insulated from constitutional review precisely be-
cause they are traditional257 or perhaps because the Constitu-
tion’s text or original meaning compels as much.258 Burkean 
judges might preserve incidental burdens because the burdens 
are likely to reflect shared wisdom or because of the costs of 
change—to avoid disrupting a long-standing web of incidental 
regulations, courts might simply determine (perhaps sub silen-
tio) that those regulations or the activities they reach simply fall 
outside the text of the Second Amendment. 
In addition to these general interpretive considerations, one 
must also account for the Second Amendment itself. As dis-
cussed in Part III, it is here that the necessity of Second 
Amendment theory becomes apparent, for there is no way to de-
termine what counts as a “canvas” without some prior determi-
nation about perspective. That framing will inevitably be driven 
in large part by a normative vision of the Second Amendment. 
That the Amendment denies coverage to felons, for example, re-
flects a law-and-order approach to its purpose.259 And when 
courts parse this category of felons, separating some from the 
 
 256 That scope becomes relevant only when a gun regulation—a ban on possession by 
felons, for example—is put into place, but it is not the ban itself that defines the scope.  
 257 See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J 
1029 (1990).  
 258 See Sachs, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1828–37 (cited in note 231). 
 259 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191, 207–11 (2008). 
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overall felon carveout, they do so with an eye toward other Se-
cond Amendment values.260 
2. Individual consequences of the burden: significance. 
Another way to evaluate the constitutional salience of an in-
cidental burden is by reference to the size of its imposition on 
the keeping and bearing of arms. Incidental burdens that are 
relatively insignificant should not be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. Those that are significant burdens should be, though of 
course they might still survive that scrutiny. 
In his insightful article about incidental burdens on funda-
mental rights, Dorf makes this significance inquiry the touch-
stone of analysis. The particular rights he studies are free exer-
cise, free speech, and equal protection, and his conclusion with 
regard to all of them is that “laws having the incidental effect of 
substantially burdening fundamental rights to engage in prima-
ry conduct should be subject to heightened scrutiny.”261 The 
same inquiry appears in other areas of constitutional rights law. 
A basic principle of regulatory takings law, for example, is that 
if a “regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”262 
The size of a regulation’s economic impact is one of the most im-
portant factors in determining whether it has gone too far.263 
With regard to guns, then, one might determine whether an 
incidental burden goes too far by reference to the impact it has 
on the activity of keeping and bearing arms. As in takings law, 
this inquiry can in turn be guided by a variety of factors, includ-
ing the level of generality at which one defines the activity that 
is burdened, the amount of activity the incidental burden pro-
hibits, and the theory explaining why the activity is constitu-
tionally protected in the first place. 
As Judge Jeffrey Sutton put it, “Level of generality is destiny 
in interpretive disputes.”264 Whether an incidental burden ap-
pears significant or trivial depends on how narrowly or broadly 
 
 260 See, for example, United States v Moore, 666 F3d 313, 320 (4th Cir 2012); United 
States v Barton, 633 F3d 168, 174 (3d Cir 2011).  
 261 Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 175). 
 262 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 US at 415.  
 263 Penn Central, 438 US at 124 (“The economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations [in deter-
mining whether there is a taking for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment].”). 
 264 Thomas More Law Center v Obama, 651 F3d 529, 560 (6th Cir 2011) (Sutton 
concurring). 
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one defines the activity that is being burdened. In the takings 
arena, courts have struggled to decide the metric that one 
should use to measure whether a “total” taking has occurred—
whether, for example, to consider a regulation that affects sub-
terranean mineral rights as a parcel separate from the sur-
face.265 This is often described as the denominator problem. 
With regard to guns, the denominator problem is analogous 
and equally fraught. When does a regulation (whether direct or 
indirect) constitute a ban, and when is it simply a regulation of 
one aspect of gun ownership? If, for example, a municipal zoning 
code or local nuisance law were to effectively forbid people from 
shooting guns on their private property, courts would have to 
determine whether this state of affairs were a ban on the bear-
ing of arms at home or merely a regulation of one stick in the 
bundle of rights.266 
Ultimately, the most fundamental challenge is not methodo-
logical so much as it is normative. Without a clear theory of the 
Second Amendment’s values, there is simply no way to charac-
terize or measure the significance of a burden. For example, a 
government regulation that completely deprives a property of 
economic value is treated as a taking.267 But this rule makes 
sense only because economic value is widely accepted as a rele-
vant characteristic of property protected by the Takings 
Clause—it is, in that context, the value that the law seeks to 
protect. Second Amendment theory has not yet defined analo-
gous values with sufficient specificity. As discussed in more de-
tail below,268 the self-defense right established in Heller is capa-
ble of multiple substantive interpretations, each of which has 
different implications for what burdens are considered constitu-
tionally salient. 
 
 265 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 US at 412–13. 
 266 See Friedman v City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F3d 406, 410 (7th Cir 
2015) (considering, inter alia, “whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of 
self-defense”). 
 267 Lucas, 505 US at 1019. 
 268 See Part III. 
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3. Structural consequences of the burden: the impact of 
scrutiny on the system. 
A second consequentialist factor addresses the impact of a 
burden on “structural” values269 rather than on the interests of in-
dividual rights holders. Under this approach, judges should avoid 
constitutional scrutiny when it threatens to upset settled institu-
tional arrangements, such as the division between public and pri-
vate regulation, the distinctive role of courts, or federalism. 
State-action doctrine provides that, with limited excep-
tions,270 constitutional provisions only apply against the gov-
ernment.271 One function of this doctrine is to preserve a private 
sphere in which individuals can govern themselves as they see 
fit. Without some kind of limitation on the reach of constitution-
al rights—and we presume not that the state-action require-
ment is the ideal limitation but only that it serves this pur-
pose—all forms of private ordering would be subject to 
constitutional restrictions, perhaps reducing the scope of indi-
vidual liberty.272 
Though it technically applies to almost all constitutional 
claims, the state-action requirement is particularly relevant to 
incidental burdens imposed by private causes of action rooted in 
the common law. Typically, if one private party brings a trespass 
action against another, the defendant cannot raise a free speech 
or equal protection defense.273 But sometimes the judicial en-
forcement of private rights is treated as state action. In Shelley, 
 
 269 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 Tex L Rev 695, 721 (1980) (“Structural 
arguments are inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the rela-
tionships that the Constitution ordains among the structures of government.”). 
 270 The Thirteenth Amendment is perhaps the most prominent example. See, for 
example, Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409, 438 (1968); Civil Rights Cases, 109 
US 3, 20 (1883).  
 271 As to whether the Second Amendment has a state-action requirement, some gun-
rights activists seem to disagree. See The NRA Should Hold Its Fire (Bloomberg, Aug 14, 
2005), archived at http://perma.cc/VH3E-GQ9U; Marquez, Employers Fire Back (cited in 
note 132). 
 272 See Lillian BeVier and John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 
96 Va L Rev 1767, 1822 (2010).  
 273 Courts have carved out exceptions to the state-action requirement when a private 
party is entangled with, performing the functions of, or otherwise behaving like the gov-
ernment. Assuming these exceptions apply in Second Amendment cases, their reach is 
quite limited. See, for example, Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary School Athlet-
ic Association, 531 US 288, 291 (2001) (holding that a nonprofit athletic association’s regu-
latory activity was state action because of the “pervasive entwinement of state school offi-
cials in the structure of the association”); Nixon v Condon, 286 US 73, 84–85 (1932). 
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for instance, the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause 
bars judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.274 
In free speech law, some of the most important and recog-
nizable cases involve civil liability. In New York Times Co v Sul-
livan,275 for example, the Court quickly disposed of the argument 
(endorsed by Alabama’s Supreme Court) that libel judgments 
are not subject to the First Amendment: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the 
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which peti-
tioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitu-
tional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that 
law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common 
law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the 
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever 
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.276 
Since New York Times, the Court has repeatedly applied First 
Amendment scrutiny to civil lawsuits between private parties.277 
Indeed, the New York Times Court suggested that civil suits 
may present a greater threat to First Amendment interests than 
criminal prosecutions do, because civil suits lack procedural 
safeguards such as grand jury indictments and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.278 
Exploring the foundations of state-action doctrine is far be-
yond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, we assume 
that some incidental burdens on gun-related activities meet the 
state-action threshold: certainly those imposed by gun-neutral 
statutes and regulations, and—as with free speech—some civil 
rules as well. But courts should nonetheless be cautious about 
applying the Second Amendment in disputes between private 
parties to preserve sufficient space for private ordering and 
choice. Businesses and HOAs, for example, might argue that 
they should not be subjected to constitutional litigation every 
time they want to exclude guns and that gun owners who wish 
 
 274 Shelley, 334 US at 20. Though never overruled, Shelley’s impact has been muted, 
and even those who celebrate the result sometimes question its rightness. See Mark D. 
Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 Cal L Rev 
451, 457–69 (2007); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 Harv L Rev 1, 29–31 (1959).  
 275 376 US 254 (1964). 
 276 Id at 265 (citation omitted). 
 277 See, for example, Snyder v Phelps, 131 S Ct 1207, 1215–19 (2011); Time, Inc v 
Hill, 385 US 374, 387–89 (1967). 
 278 New York Times, 376 US at 277–78. 
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to carry guns in public can simply choose to visit other estab-
lishments.279 Again, these are arguments not about levels of 
scrutiny (the safety interests of an HOA versus the interests of 
traveling visitors) but rather about the burdens imposed by rec-
ognizing a constitutional claim in the first instance. 
The division between state and private actions is not the on-
ly structural issue that is relevant to the prudence of constitu-
tional scrutiny of incidental burdens. Courts might also consider 
the resource demands on their dockets. As Professor Marin Levy 
has shown, the Supreme Court does sometimes invoke “flood-
gates” concerns when defining the contours of substantive 
rights.280 Such concerns seem especially pertinent in the context 
of incidental burdens. Indeed, nearly all regulations impose 
some incidental burdens on protected conduct, and subjecting 
them all to constitutional scrutiny would be overwhelming.281 
The threat is not so much that the challenges will succeed but 
rather that they will generate costs and uncertainty. If every as-
sault case involving a gun were subject to a Second Amendment 
defense, courts would be clogged with constitutional claims that 
would, even if weak, require attention. Much of the regulatory 
state would grind to a halt if every law concerning lead, copper, 
or labor were scrutinized to see what effect it has on keeping and 
bearing arms, whether or not it was actually aimed at firearms 
in the first place.282 Applying scrutiny generates costs; denying 
protection is costlier in this regard than denying coverage. 
In addition to the burdens it would place on the judiciary, 
subjecting neutral laws of general applicability to heightened 
scrutiny could potentially interfere with the other branches of 
government. As the Court remarked when it refused to apply 
heightened scrutiny to laws with racially unequal impacts, “[a] 
rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is neverthe-
less invalid . . . if in practice it benefits or burdens one race 
more than another . . . would raise serious questions about, and 
 
 279 Whether a private party may claim a Second Amendment right to designate who 
may be armed on its property is a related issue. See Blocher, 64 Stan L Rev at 41–44 
(cited in note 113). 
 280 Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U Chi L Rev 1007, 1008–
10 (2013). 
 281 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1199 (cited in note 175). 
 282 See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Hel-
ler: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L Rev 1041, 
1084 (2009) (comparing regulatory-cost concerns arising after Heller to the Court’s re-
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titrust laws that are applicable to other businesses”). 
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perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes.”283 These costs would be fur-
ther compounded by federalism concerns, since many of the most 
significant incidental burdens on firearms are imposed by tradi-
tional subjects of state law such as tort and property. 
Advocates of broad gun rights might argue that these struc-
tural concerns are subordinate to the most important structural 
principle: the Supremacy Clause.284 But with regard to inci-
dental burdens, the relevant and difficult question is not wheth-
er the Second Amendment should trump other laws but whether 
it is implicated at all. Nothing in Article VI answers that critical 
question. 
4. Character of the burden: purpose and design. 
A fourth way to consider whether the Second Amendment 
should apply to an incidental burden on guns is by asking 
whether the law imposing the burden operates like gun control. 
When a supposedly incidental burden is in fact directed at pro-
tected conduct, it is more properly a subject of constitutional 
scrutiny, if not necessarily of constitutional invalidation. 
This inquiry is not quite as circular as it might sound. 
Courts and scholars must often address whether common-law 
claims should be treated as a kind of public regulation for the 
purposes of state-action doctrine. Sometimes their answer has 
been yes, as in New York Times and Shelley. Similarly, the im-
position of damages by a jury might appear to be simple restora-
tive justice between parties, but in BMW of North America, Inc v 
Gore,285 the Court held, inter alia, that the deterrence function of 
a punitive award transformed private justice into government 
regulation that was subject to due process requirements.286 
Drawing from these cases, some characteristics of an inci-
dental burden might make it appear more akin to regulation 
than to private ordering. If an incidental burden were imposed 
solely to deter otherwise-innocuous gun-related activities or to 
 
 283 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 248 (1976). In this Article, we do not discuss the 
wisdom of affirmative legislative protections such as the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act or the disparate impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See gen-
erally Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 
Cardozo L Rev 1815 (2011) (defending political protections for religious accommodations).  
 284 US Const Art VI, cl 2. 
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punish gun owners specifically rather than to compensate vic-
tims, then the character of the regulation might warrant consti-
tutional scrutiny. Consider, for example, a facially neutral noise 
ordinance tailored to affect the only gun range in a municipality. 
Similarly, permitting punitive damages only for reckless use of a 
firearm, but not for reckless use of a vehicle, could justify the 
application of constitutional scrutiny. This is not to say, of 
course, that the former law would be unconstitutional—only 
that it might have to satisfy Second Amendment rules. 
Showing that a given law has the purpose of restricting 
guns as such is not necessarily as straightforward as, for exam-
ple, finding viewpoint discrimination in speech regulations. 
Some scholars attribute some gun regulations to hatred of 
guns287 or even to “bigotry.”288 But it seems likely that most gun 
control supporters are concerned not with guns themselves but 
instead with the negative consequences of their misuse. In that 
sense, even direct gun control is akin not to content or viewpoint 
discrimination—which can trigger First Amendment scrutiny 
even when targeting otherwise-unprotected activities289—but ra-
ther to regulations targeting secondary effects.290 Reducing the 
lethality of confrontations and making negligent actors compen-
sate those whom they injure are content-neutral in this sense. 
They are focused on harms, not on guns. 
In the end, the question whether incidental burdens should be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny simply cannot be answered using 
the usual tools of doctrinal analysis. As Schauer notes with regard 
to free speech, “the location of the boundaries themselves—the 
threshold determination of what is a First Amendment case and 
 
 287 See, for example, Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Consti-
tutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 Brooklyn L Rev 715, 795 (2005) (“Some people viscer-
ally hate guns, see no utility in them and think it is insane to talk about balancing factors 
like the benefits of defensive gun use and the political value of an armed citizenry.”). 
 288 David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 Tenn 
L Rev 417, 462 (2014). 
 289 See R.A.V., 505 US at 418: 
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 290 See City of Los Angeles v Alameda Books, Inc, 535 US 425, 432, 442 (2002) (re-
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what is not—is less a doctrinal matter than a political, economic, 
social, and cultural one.”291 We have done our best to exhaust the 
internal tools, but at some point this kind of external analysis 
becomes inevitable. And it, in turn, requires some account—
thicker than we now have—of what the Second Amendment is 
for. The following Part addresses that need. 
III.  A SECOND GENERATION OF SECOND AMENDMENT THEORY 
We have identified a set of legal tools that can be used to de-
termine whether a Second Amendment claim is cognizable. But 
the tools are just that; they must be employed with some pur-
pose in mind. In the context of the Second Amendment, that 
means having a theory of what the right is all about. Whether 
particular tort or property rules are enshrined in the text and 
history of the Second Amendment depends on what principles 
and values underlie the Amendment itself. What kinds of bur-
dens are significant varies depending on whether one sees the 
Second Amendment as concerned with self-defense against 
crime or against the government. 
Again, these are boundary questions—issues of coverage ra-
ther than of protection. The point is not simply that Second 
Amendment ideology shapes people’s ideas of permissible gun 
control. Rather, one’s theory of the Second Amendment also de-
termines what one sees as gun control in the first place. Wheth-
er a negligence action for failure to safely store a firearm is a 
background norm that the Second Amendment does not cover, or 
a regulation that it does, depends on what you think the 
Amendment is all about. 
The answer to this underlying question cannot be found in 
Heller or McDonald. In somewhat-simplified and often-
misunderstood terms, those cases hold that the Amendment pro-
tects an “individual” right to keep and bear arms, whose “core” 
and “central component” is “self-defense.”292 Critics and support-
ers alike have read these cases as ending the doctrinal debate 
over what the Second Amendment is really about.293 But although 
the Court has taken some arguments off the table—for example, 
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those that are premised solely on militia service294—it has also 
generated demand for a new generation of Second Amendment 
theory. At least three different accounts seem plausible, all of 
which are consistent with a self-defense core. 
Although we believe that determining the Second Amend-
ment’s boundaries requires some account of its purpose or value, 
we do not suppose that the judges answering these questions 
will necessarily adopt a comprehensive theory of the Second 
Amendment. Most judges are likely to continue deciding Second 
Amendment cases with a healthy dose of pragmatism and intui-
tion. Our goal is to try to discern some pattern to these deci-
sions, relate them to existing and future questions, and explain 
the whole in a more transparent and integrated way. Whether 
the resulting categories are called approaches, theories, values, 
or principles is of no real significance. 
Nor do we suppose that a single account of the Second 
Amendment will command unanimous support, any more than 
agreement has emerged regarding a theory of free speech or 
equal protection. But skepticism about theoretical consensus is 
no reason to leave the theory unarticulated or unexamined. Our 
goal here is modest: to articulate three plausible Second 
Amendment values and to briefly identify their weaknesses and 
strengths. 
A. Autonomy 
As with free speech, the right to keep and bear arms could 
have some kind of intrinsic value—one that is rooted in an indi-
vidual right to personal autonomy.295 This view resonates with 
the strongly libertarian flavor of much gun-rights rhetoric. 
A person who subscribes to this autonomy view of the Se-
cond Amendment is primarily concerned with the liberty of self-
reliance, not with instrumental ends like preventing tyranny or 
even promoting personal safety. This person will not be satisfied 
with the proposition that gun control would make him safer 
(even assuming that he believes such a thing), just as it would 
be unsatisfying for him to say that another person’s speech can 
 
 294 Heller, 554 US at 593 (“[The right to keep and bear arms] was clearly an individ-
ual right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia.”). 
 295 See Green, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 154 (cited in note 37); Robert Weisberg, Book 
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be silenced so long as his ideas are expressed or that a person’s 
vote can be taken so long as his political positions are represent-
ed. Weaker forms of this autonomy rationale make suspect inci-
dental common-law rules like a duty to retreat296 or a duty to 
submit to an unlawful arrest.297 The strongest form of the auton-
omy theory is completely unconcerned with any collateral effect 
created by the possession of a firearm. In this strong version, a 
blind person has as much of a right to a firearm as a sighted 
person.298 
With regard to incidental burdens on gun rights, the hard-
est questions for the autonomy theory are also the most inevita-
ble: what to do when one individual’s choice conflicts with an-
other individual’s right—as, for example, when a store owner 
seeks to exclude a gun carrier. On the one hand, the gun owner’s 
autonomous right to keep and bear arms is threatened, which 
suggests that the Second Amendment might be put into play to 
defend it. On the other hand, doing so would threaten the store 
owner’s autonomous right to determine whether guns on his 
property further or threaten his self-defense interests, irrespec-
tive of any data showing that the store owner may be safer by 
allowing the gun owners to enter the store.299 This is not a ten-
sion that can be resolved from within the Second Amendment—
it requires recourse to broader considerations of ethics and polit-
ical theory. 
One of the central complications with an autonomy view of 
the Second Amendment is that—like autonomy approaches to 
the First Amendment—it may be overexpansive. If people can 
assert Second Amendment claims against incidental burdens 
based simply on the fact that they consider gun ownership to be 
important to their identities, then extending constitutional cov-
erage seems more like the granting of an unfair subsidy. This 
was one of the concerns underlying Smith. In that case, the peti-
tioner argued that the use of peyote was part of his religious 
practice and that denying him unemployment benefits based on 
 
 296 See, for example, State v Johnson, 152 NW2d 529, 532 (Minn 1967) (identifying 
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 297 See Miller, 86 Ind L J at 941–42 (cited in note 296). 
 298 See William Kremer, Guide Dogs and Guns: America’s Blind Gunmen (BBC, Aug 
13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z57H-D5AX.  
 299 See Blocher, 64 Stan L Rev at 42 (cited in note 113). 
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his drug use therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause.300 The 
Court disagreed: “To permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in 
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”301 The 
majority concluded that “neutral law[s] of general applicability” 
should be subject to only rational basis review, even when they 
have the impact of regulating religiously motivated activity.302 
The analogy to gun rights is not hard to see. If the Second 
Amendment immunized individuals from generally applicable 
laws like trespass, nuisance, and assault based on their auton-
omy interests, then it would essentially permit each person’s 
“belief” about armed self-defense to be “superior to the law of the 
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself.”303 But it cannot be the case that a person’s sincere fear 
gives him the right to keep whatever arms make him feel secure 
and to bear them whenever he feels insecure. That is not how 
self-defense law works,304 and it would be surprising if it became 
part of a constitutional right predicated on self-defense. 
B. Democracy 
A second way to understand the Second Amendment is as a 
bulwark of democracy, guaranteeing the means of self-defense 
against a potentially tyrannical government. Though the popular 
view (and legal concept) of self-defense tends to focus on its rela-
tionship to personal safety against other private citizens, some 
gun-rights advocates instead focus—even after Heller—on the 
role of guns in preventing government tyranny.305 This approach 
 
 300 Smith, 494 US at 874–75. 
 301 Id at 879, citing Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto) 145, 166–67 (1878). See 
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cise Clause”). 
 302 Smith, 494 US at 879, 885–89. 
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 304 See, for example, United States v Acosta-Sierra, 690 F3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th Cir 
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 305 See, for example, Joshua Horwitz and Casey Anderson, Taking Gun Rights Seri-
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is roughly analogous to free speech theories that are based on 
the role of speech in preserving or constituting democracy. 
This view, too, has important implications for what kinds of 
gun regulations are cognizable. Rather than personal safety or 
autonomy, the underlying value in the democracy theory of the 
Second Amendment is the prevention of governmental tyran-
ny—rules that threaten this checking value are most likely to be 
seen as problematic. With regard to incidental burdens in par-
ticular, believers in the antityranny, self-defense-against-
government view of the Second Amendment are likely to be par-
ticularly sensitive to the state-action requirement—when the 
government is acting, they might say, the danger of tyranny is 
ever present. 
Even assuming that the state-action requirement is satis-
fied, however, hard questions remain about whether to subject 
incidental burdens to constitutional review. For a believer in the 
antityranny view, structural concerns—especially those that fo-
cus on the role of limited federal power—are primary. But it is 
not immediately obvious which way those concerns should point. 
On the one hand, any obvious state action—a statute or 
regulation, for example—may raise fears of tyranny, notwith-
standing the incidental nature of the burden imposed. Some 
supporters of broad gun rights argue that the Amendment itself 
was enacted in large part because of incidental burdens on gun 
carrying. It is common, for example, to argue that supposedly 
neutral regulations of general applicability like the English 
game laws and rules against affray and disturbing the peace 
were used to eviscerate the freedom of people to keep and bear 
arms. If that is so, then the very purpose of the right might have 
been to protect against such incidental burdens. 
In other cases, however, subjecting incidental burdens—
especially those arising from private rights of action—to constitu-
tional scrutiny can mean interjecting the government (courts, 
specifically) into most cases of private ordering. If, for example, 
trespass actions by homeowners against gun carriers can give rise 
to Second Amendment claims, then judges will be in the position 
of exercising government authority against private parties. That 
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can raise fears of tyranny just as surely as direct government 
regulation will. 
C. Personal Safety 
Perhaps the best-known theory of free speech is the mar-
ketplace of ideas metaphor attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”306 Speech 
must be free to enable this competition, which is more likely 
than state-imposed orthodoxy to lead to truth, knowledge, and 
other good results. As Justice Louis Brandeis put it in his own 
statement of the marketplace rationale, “[F]reedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth.”307 
An analogous theory—which could be called the “market-
place of violence,” though its persuasiveness does not depend on 
the strength of the analogy—seems to motivate a great deal of 
thinking about guns and gun control. On this theory, the state 
does not possess a monopoly on violence.308 The individual pos-
sesses an inalienable right to threaten violence through the 
keeping and bearing of arms, which contributes to personal safe-
ty in roughly the same way that speech contributes to truth. 
Some acts of violence—like some ideas—will be undesirable, but 
they will be deterred or stopped by desirable acts of violence, 
such as those involving justified self-defense. As with speech, 
desirable exercises of the right (those that advance self-defense 
or truth) will win out over undesirable activities (those that 
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promote safety threats or falsehoods).309 In both instances, the 
marketplace metaphor rests on a confident and optimistic vision 
of the world. Indeed, there is a striking similarity between 
Brandeis’s conclusion that (with important limitations) when 
falsehood arises “the remedy to be applied is more speech”310 and 
the NRA’s argument that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy 
with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”311 
As with the marketplace of ideas, there might be at least 
three grounds for opposing government efforts to regulate the 
marketplace of violence: epistemic distrust, inequality, and fear 
of corruption. Epistemic objections are true marketplace argu-
ments: the government is simply incapable of generating opti-
mal safety through gun regulation, and the invisible hand of the 
market will provide better (that is, safer) results.312 Equality ob-
jections are inflected with autonomy rationales: even if the gov-
ernment could design a regime for optimal safety, it is inequita-
ble for the government to elevate the self-defense interests of, 
say, armored car drivers over school bus drivers. Finally, corrup-
tion arguments are inflected with democracy rationales: the 
government should not be able to regulate firearms, because it 
will always do so in a way that protects insiders. 
In the context of the Second Amendment, market theories 
operate similarly with regard to personal safety. For epistemic 
market advocates, laws that regulate guns in the name of per-
sonal safety should be subject to heightened scrutiny precisely 
because personal safety is best achieved through broad gun 
ownership.313 For equality advocates, the government must show 
why burdens on eighteen-year-olds are justified compared to 
burdens on twenty-one-year-olds, or how regulating knives dif-
ferently from pistols does not impermissibly harm those who 
prefer to protect themselves with blades rather than with bul-
lets. For objections based on corruption, the government’s desire 
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to empower its own agents—say, the police or the National 
Guard—over others is a cause for constitutional concern. 
Although the marketplace-of-violence model is descriptively 
and rhetorically powerful, there are important distinctions be-
tween the application of marketplace logic in the contexts of 
speech and guns. Those distinctions might render one or the 
other more normatively desirable or analytically useful. Many 
people undoubtedly perceive the stakes to be higher—or at least 
more immediate—in the context of guns and personal violence 
than speech.314 Even justified acts of self-defense generally are 
seen as a regrettable necessity, not as the same kind of unal-
loyed benefit as a “good” idea. Moreover, the actual competition 
between ideas imposes relatively few costs and may even be a 
benefit (the lifeblood of public discourse, after all, is exactly this 
kind of competition). By contrast, the competition between 
guns—even from the perspective of those who believe in strong 
gun rights—is more of a necessary evil than a positive good. In-
deed, from one perspective, the marketplace of violence could be 
nothing less than a failure of one of the central purposes of the 
state—preventing prisoner’s dilemmas by claiming a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of violence.315 
Heller and McDonald represent a bookend to the first gen-
eration of Second Amendment theorizing, which focused on 
whether the Amendment is limited to militias. But they also set 
the stage for another round of theoretical debate. The task now 
is to flesh out, as scholars have done for generations with the 
First Amendment, what the new Second Amendment right is re-
ally about. As we have tried to show here, the scope of permissi-
ble gun regulation—whether or not it is labeled as such—
depends on the answer. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Owen Roberts famously provided a draftsman’s model 
of judicial review: all a judge must do is lay the Constitution 
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beside the law and “decide whether the latter squares with the 
former.”316 But as the pressure of Second Amendment litigation 
increases, the most difficult and consequential choice for judges 
will be not about squaring constitutional proportions but about 
whether to pick up the Constitution in the first place. We have 
described various tools that judges and others can use, as well 
as theories that they will need, to perform that increasingly es-
sential task. 
 
 316 United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 62 (1936). 
